Climate Change and Counterpublics

In recent decades, the international debate on climate change has established itself as one of the main arenas of political dispute in the 21st century. The intensification of extreme weather events, observed in virtually every region of the planet, has demonstrated that global warming is not a future prediction but an ongoing process whose consequences are already shaping economies, societies, and ecosystems. The Paris Agreement, signed in 2015, symbolized the most ambitious attempt to articulate a multilateral response to the crisis, establishing targets to contain the increase in global average temperature to a maximum of 1.5°C. Considered one of the most important international agreements in history, its preamble also marked the unprecedented mention of the concept of climate justice. However, the first Global Stocktake, released in 2023, confirmed what many analysts had already anticipated: national commitments still fall short of what is necessary, and the window of opportunity to avoid climate collapse scenarios is rapidly narrowing. More than just numbers and reports, the assessment revealed a fundamental political dilemma: international climate governance cannot be merely technical or diplomatic, but must be inclusive, capable of expanding the representation of multiple actors, especially those historically marginalized—such as indigenous peoples, Black populations, Afro-descendants, quilombolas, and traditional communities.

Holding COP30 in Brazil in 2025 fits into this context of urgency and inadequacy. It is not just another conference, but a milestone that could redefine both the country's position on the global stage and the relationship between democracy and climate policy domestically. By hosting the conference in Belém do Pará, in the heart of the Amazon, Brazil takes on the challenge of articulating global and local narratives, economic interests and demands for social justice, scientific knowledge and traditional knowledge. More than crafting diplomatic commitments, COP30 will be a test of legitimacy: will Brazil be able to show the world that it is possible to build climate governance rooted in social and environmental diversity in all its multiple dimensions and intersections, or will it reproduce the exact exclusionary mechanisms that have limited the effectiveness of previous conferences? The answer will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to strengthen the spaces for action of climate counterpublics.

PUBLIC SPHERE AND NANCY FRASER'S COUNTERPUBLICS 

Jürgen Habermas's theory of the public sphere provides an important starting point for understanding the political dimension of the issue. Habermas described the public sphere as a space for rational deliberation, in which citizens discuss issues of common interest and form collective opinions that can influence political decisions. This idealized conception, while illuminating central aspects of modern democracy, has been criticized for assuming a level playing field that rarely exists in practice. Nancy Fraser, in a critical dialogue with Habermas, emphasized that societies structured by gender, class, and racial inequalities do not produce a homogeneous public sphere, but rather multiple arenas in which marginalized groups construct their own discursive spaces. These subaltern counterpublics, rather than being mere fragments, play an essential role: they allow silenced voices to express themselves, formulate their own agendas, and challenge the dominant public sphere. In doing so, they broaden the horizons of democracy and introduce new parameters of justice.

When we apply this framework to climate policy, the contrast becomes clear. The Conferences of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention (COPs) are conceived as multilateral arenas in which nation-states negotiate global commitments. However, in practice, they also function as spaces of exclusion, where state and corporate protagonism overshadows the participation of indigenous peoples, traditional communities, youth movements, and peripheral urban collectives. What Fraser would call climate counterpublics emerge precisely in this void: organizations that produce alternative narratives, denounce socio-environmental injustices, and propose development models distinct from the dominant extractivist logic. The presence of these counterpublics is not incidental; it is a condition for climate governance to be not only compelling but also legitimate.

EMERGENCY AND ACTION OF CLIMATE COUNTERPUBLICS IN BRAZIL 

The Brazilian case vividly illustrates this dynamic. Throughout its recent history, the country has oscillated between being a climate protagonist—especially when it presented itself as a leader in renewable energy and a defender of the Amazon—and experiencing periods of scientific denial and institutional dismantling. This oscillation reached its peak during the previous administration, marked by characteristics of a hybrid regime: a formally democratic state that operated with authoritarian practices, restricting civil liberties and drastically reducing the space for social participation. The weakening of environmental agencies, the criminalization of non-governmental organizations, and the increase in violence against forest defenders are just some examples of the process of civic closure experienced during this period. In this context, climate policy could not be dissociated from the quality of democracy. 

Furthermore, it must be recognized that without confronting racism, there will be no democracy. This is the motto of the Black Coalition for Rights, which challenges one of the most important historical challenges since colonization. In this sense, we reinforce the premise that counterpublics are not monolithic and that the climate crisis is also a racial crisis. 

It was precisely in the face of the shrinking civic space that Brazilian civil society consolidated and advanced the social participation of its counterpublics. Platforms such as the Climate Observatory, Engajamundo, the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB), the Brazil Climate, Forests, and Agriculture Coalition, the Black Coalition for Rights, as well as youth collectives, quilombolas, and community-based organizations, created their own arenas to formulate diagnoses, produce independent data, and maintain the climate agenda's visibility on the international stage. Within this process, Brazil's Indigenous peoples assumed a central role in shaping climate counterpublics. Through the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB), the Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB), and the Indigenous Caucus, which are occupying multilateral spaces, these actors have expanded the politics of the climate debate. Their contribution is not limited to denouncing violations such as the escalation of violence in territories and the environmental devastation driven by mining and agricultural expansion, but is expressed in the struggle to recognize indigenous science, their ways of life, their ancestral technologies, and for the demarcation of territories to be recognized as an effective climate policy. 

These organizations not only resisted regressive policies but also innovated: they built transnational networks, denounced setbacks in multilateral forums, presented bioeconomy alternatives, and articulated strategies for climate justice and combating environmental racism. The actions of these counterpublics enabled Brazil to maintain its particular relevance in the global debate, even as the central government positioned itself as a denialist. 

The mobilization power of counterpublics, in national and global contexts, is anchored in three dimensions: participation, representation, and historical reparation. Given the imminent invisibility and oppression of many intersecting issues of gender, race, class, and territory, it is imperative that we find pathways and measures for inclusion to counter the deepening of inequalities. 

This trajectory reveals a fundamental point: Brazilian climate policy is inseparable from democratic vitality. When state institutions recede, it is the counterpublics that ensure the continuity of deliberation and the visibility of essential agendas. At the same time, experience shows that the centrality of these actors cannot depend solely on the political situation, under penalty of overload and vulnerability. It is necessary to institutionalize participation mechanisms that guarantee a permanent space for these groups, regardless of alternating governments.

COP30 AS A DEMOCRATIC EXERCISE

COP30, in this sense, can be understood as a democratic exercise. Held in Belém, in the heart of the Amazon, the conference carries an enormous symbolic weight: it connects Brazil to the Amazon and the Amazon to Brazil, placing the forest, quilombos, peripheries, and their peoples at the center of decisions about the future of the country and the planet. However, this symbolism will only be meaningful if it translates into concrete practices of inclusion. It is not enough to guarantee physical spaces for civil society; it is necessary to ensure that these counterpublics are able to intervene substantively in negotiations and influence the formulation of official positions. This requires institutional design, inclusion tools, financial resources, and political will.

The challenge is enormous. Historically, the areas designated for civil society at COPs occupy a peripheral position, both geographically and in decision-making. Brazil's opportunity lies in breaking this pattern, offering the world an innovative conference model in which counterpublics not only witness but also participate. The incorporation of Indigenous, Quilombola, and community knowledge can enrich solutions by bringing integrated visions of multiple territorialities and nature. Youth movements, by emphasizing urgency and innovation, can challenge inertial narratives. Peripheral urban collectives, by denouncing environmental inequalities, can reposition climate justice as a central axis. Black and Indigenous movements, by denouncing institutional and structural racism, open paths for other realities silenced for centuries to demand agendas for good living. The diversity of voices should not be seen as an obstacle but as a source of legitimacy and creativity, pointing to an ancestral future. 

At the same time, the risks must be recognized. The mere presence of counterpublics does not guarantee transformation. Often, their participation is instrumentalized to legitimize decisions that have already been made. Furthermore, the multiplicity of voices can lead to fragmentation, making it difficult to build consensus and shared agendas. The challenge is to articulate plurality and convergence. Recent experiences in Brazil, such as the Concertação pela Amazônia, show that it is possible to bring together diverse sectors—civil society, the private sector, academia, and local communities—around minimal commitments, without erasing differences. This ability to forge coalitions will be crucial for COP30 to transcend the stage and become a transformative process.

The geopolitical dimension cannot be overlooked. Brazil will host the conference at a time of reconfiguration of the international order, marked by tensions between major powers, wars, and disputes over strategic resources. On the one hand, the country is expected to lead in defending the Amazon and promoting the bioeconomy. On the other hand, internal and external pressures for agricultural expansion and fossil fuel exploitation persist. Counterpublics will play a central role in addressing these contradictions, ensuring that the quest for international prominence does not translate into concessions that compromise socio-environmental integrity. As Ailton Krenak teaches us, the crisis we are experiencing is not only environmental, but also civilizational, in which "postponing the end of the world" involves recognizing the Earth as a living organism and reclaiming sensitivity to other ways of existing. 

The connection between climate and democracy thus becomes inescapable. Climate policy decisions define development models, distribute costs and benefits, and reorganize territories. In unequal societies like Brazil's, these decisions can either reproduce injustices or contribute to correcting them. The inclusion of counterpublics increases the chance that the latter option will prevail. By creating mechanisms to make visible those who suffer disproportionately from the impacts of the climate crisis compared to those who have innovative solutions, climate democracy strengthens both the legitimacy and effectiveness of policies.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 

COP30 will, therefore, be a historic test. Brazil will have the chance to demonstrate that it is possible to build climate governance rooted in social and environmental diversity, based not only on diplomatic commitments but on concrete participatory practices. If successful, the conference could inspire new models of climate democracy, in which the public sphere and counterpublics are not opposed, but rather complementary. If it fails, it risks reinforcing skepticism toward climate multilateralism and missing a unique opportunity to reconnect the Amazon, Brazil, and the world around a common project.

Ultimately, what is at stake is more than the future of the climate. It is the very future of democracy. The recent Brazilian experience has shown that hybrid regimes can erode institutions without formally disrupting them, and that civic spaces can be restricted even under a democratic guise. The actions of counterpublics, by resisting and innovating in adverse times, have proven crucial to preserving not only the climate agenda but also democratic vitality. COP30 represents a chance to recognize and institutionalize this contribution, transforming practices of resistance into pillars of a new governance.

The 21st century will demand unprecedented responses to interconnected global crises. Brazil, with its social diversity and environmental wealth, has the potential to offer the world a model of climate democracy in which plurality is not a threat, but a condition of legitimacy and effectiveness. The success of COP30 will depend on our ability to learn from counterpublics and to allow their voices not only to be heard but also incorporated into decision-making. Ultimately, this integration will determine whether the country is prepared to lead not only in environmental but also in democratic fields. Therefore, there will be no climate justice without a systematic and committed confrontation of racism, inequality, and all the axes of oppression that permeate the climate agenda. 

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Submitted: 3 de outubro de 2025

Accepted for publication: 7 de outubro de 2025

* Translated by Victoria Corrêa do Lago with the support of digital machine translation tools: Google Translate (initial draft), Grammarly (grammatical and syntactic revision), and ChatGPT (selective phrasing refinements). Reviewed by the author.

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