Since July 2025, the United States has steadily escalated its trade pressure on Brazil, with the most significant developments occurring over the past two weeks. On July 15, 2026, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) concluded its Section 301 investigation into Brazilian practices, covering issues ranging from digital trade to deforestation. Beginning on July 22, the United States imposed an additional 25% tariff on most Brazilian goods, while granting named exemptions for products such as beef, orange juice, and energy products. The measure followed negotiation efforts that began in April 2025 but failed to produce an agreement despite multiple rounds of talks between the two governments.
On July 24, a second layer of tariffs entered into force: an additional duty of up to 12.5%, linked to a forced labor investigation affecting approximately 60 U.S. trading partners, with Brazil placed in the highest tariff bracket. The USTR exempted 471 Brazilian products from this specific surcharge—including coffee, oil, natural gas, fertilizers, and orange juice—but for all other products, the measure is cumulative, raising the total tariff burden to as much as 37.5% on part of Brazil's exports to the United States. A third possibility also remains on the table: the application of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, a provision recently invoked by the Trump administration against Canada as a source of leverage in trade negotiations. Although never before used in this way, many analysts view it as a potential additional instrument of pressure should Brazil refuse to make concessions.
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Since July 2025, the United States has steadily escalated its trade pressure on Brazil, with the most significant developments occurring over the past two weeks. On July 15, 2026, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) concluded its Section 301 investigation into Brazilian practices, covering issues ranging from digital trade to deforestation. Beginning on July 22, the United States imposed an additional 25% tariff on most Brazilian goods, while granting named exemptions for products such as beef, orange juice, and energy products. The measure followed negotiation efforts that began in April 2025 but failed to produce an agreement despite multiple rounds of talks between the two governments.
On July 24, a second layer of tariffs entered into force: an additional duty of up to 12.5%, linked to a forced labor investigation affecting approximately 60 U.S. trading partners, with Brazil placed in the highest tariff bracket. The USTR exempted 471 Brazilian products from this specific surcharge—including coffee, oil, natural gas, fertilizers, and orange juice—but for all other products, the measure is cumulative, raising the total tariff burden to as much as 37.5% on part of Brazil's exports to the United States. A third possibility also remains on the table: the application of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, a provision recently invoked by the Trump administration against Canada as a source of leverage in trade negotiations. Although never before used in this way, many analysts view it as a potential additional instrument of pressure should Brazil refuse to make concessions.
International Commentator at Globo News
Senior Professor of Agribusiness at INSPER
Senior Fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Founder of URBEM
Professor at the School of Economics of São Paulo of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EESP)