Contain and Engage

The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency poses a complex challenge for President Lula’s administration, with repercussions across five key fronts: geopolitics, trade, regional politics, technology, and elections. In each of these areas, Brazil faces mounting pressure and is often treated by the Trump administration as either an adversary or an irrelevant player. In this context, the article proposes a cross-cutting strategy of “contain and engage,” which combines firmness in some areas with a willingness to negotiate in others. The central argument is that it is not feasible to negotiate with Trump solely on the issue of tariffs. Since the US market is significantly larger than Brazil’s, a negotiation focused exclusively on tariffs tends to favor the more powerful country. Even more problematic would be allowing US interference in Brazil’s internal affairs–particularly threats against the Supreme Court–to dominate the bilateral agenda.

Doing so would undermine any possibility of resolving tensions in the short or medium term. Therefore, it is essential to broaden and deepen the bilateral negotiation agenda to include multiple issues simultaneously. We argue that, in geopolitical terms, Brazil should maintain a non-aligned posture, but open negotiations with the US regarding Ukraine. On the technology front, Brazil should regulate AI and data infrastructure based on national interests, while selectively engaging with US firms and promoting multilateral standards for digital sovereignty. In trade, it should prepare mechanisms for defense and retaliation while also pursuing high-level political dialogue with Trump officials. Regionally, Brazil must find common ground on Venezuela, Haiti, organized crime, and immigration as a way to engage US authorities constructively. On the electoral front, Brazil must respond firmly to threats to its democracy arising from the Trump-Bolsonaro alliance. 

Furthermore, relying solely on Brazil’s embassy in Washington, DC, has proven insufficient to counter Jair Bolsonaro’s dominant narrative among US authorities. It is therefore essential to elevate the Vice Presidency as the institutional anchor of Brazil’s presence in Washington, DC. Ultimately, neither full-scale retaliation nor pure appeasement is effective when dealing with Trump. Brazil should avoid thematic anchoring in areas like trade or elections and instead seek to broaden the bilateral agenda. Escalating tensions with a more powerful actor could impose serious costs on the Brazilian economy. A viable path forward is to adopt a “contain and engage” strategy–combining confrontation and cooperation in a tactically flexible manner, depending on the issue at stake.

TRUMP AND LULA–A TALE OF INCREASING PRESSURE

In July 2025, the Trump administration announced a 50% tariff on all Brazilian goods exported to the United States. In a letter addressed to the Brazilian government, Trump claimed that a “witch hunt” was underway in Brazil against his friend Jair Bolsonaro. He further stated that the Brazilian Supreme Court had “issued hundreds of SECRET and UNLAWFUL censorship orders” against US social media platforms, threatening them with multimillion-dollar fines and expulsion from the Brazilian market. Finally, he argued that the massive US trade deficit with Brazil needed to be corrected–an unbelievable claim, considering the United States has maintained a historic surplus in goods and services with Brazil, totaling over $450 billion over the past fifteen years. Trump’s attack marks one of the lowest points in a relationship that spans more than 200 years. A few days earlier, Trump had already indirectly threatened Brazil by posting a message on his social media platform stating that any country aligning itself with BRICS policies would be severely penalized with tariffs. The message was delivered amid the annual BRICS summit taking place in Rio de Janeiro.

Since the inception of the Trump 2.0 administration, an intense debate is underway in various countries on how best to deal with the US president. Uncertainties about the capabilities and intentions of the United States, as well as discussions of different strategic options to address the issue, have given rise to a lucrative opinion industry among analysts and experts from academia, corporations, banks, governments, and the media around the world. This debate tends to polarize around two mutually exclusive strategies: engaging and negotiating versus retaliating and containing Trump’s mercurial decisions. This article advocates for a more nuanced approach: the strategy of “contain and engage” as a way to mitigate the negative effects of Trump’s foreign policy on Brazil.

Trump’s administration poses simultaneous challenges to Lula’s government across five key fronts: geopolitics, trade, regional politics, technology, and elections. In all of these domains, the Trump administration has gradually increased pressure on Lula. In none of them does Brazil appear as a preferred ally or strategic partner. On the contrary, Lula is either treated as an adversary or as an insignificant actor. The space for negotiation is shrinking, and political or commercial retaliation is increasingly costly.

It is fair to say that Trump has become the most pressing foreign policy challenge for Lula’s administration, especially due to the close alignment between the MAGA faction of the Republican Party and the Bolsonaro family. In January 2023, Trump argued that “President Bolsonaro loves Brazil beyond all else. He is a wonderful man, and has my Complete & Total Endorsement!!!”. Trump is not only an international challenge for Brazil–he also represents a domestic threat with potential implications for the 2026 national elections. It is widely acknowledged that Bolsonaro’s opposition seeks to activate its ties with the MAGA movement to undermine Lula’s government by any means, including by damaging key sectors of the Brazilian economy. 

In addition, figures like Elon Musk have also shown clear interest in interfering in Brazil’s elections. Musk tweeted on September 2, “The current Brazilian government likes to wear the mantle of a free democracy while crushing the people under its boot.” And on November 15, 2024, after Brazil’s first lady's derogatory comments: “They are going to lose the next election.” The greatest threat to Brazilian democracy today does not come from Putin’s Russia, but from the radicalism emanating from Trump’s Washington, DC.

But, as Vladimir Lenin once said: What is to be done? Should Brazil engage and negotiate, or retaliate and confront Trump? Should it follow China’s example by taking tougher stances, or imitate Mexico’s pragmatic approach by identifying internal divisions within the Trump administration and exploiting them in Brasília’s favor? 

This article argues that Lula’s government should adopt a dual-track strategy of containment and negotiation aimed at mitigating the negative economic and electoral impacts of a second Trump administration. A strategy of full confrontation would carry enormous political and economic costs–an option available only to great powers like China or Russia. On the other hand, open negotiation without leverage or pressure mechanisms is not respected by Trump, who generally only responds to strength. Panama serves as a cautionary tale. Early in its negotiations with Trump, the Panamanian government complied with US requests and promptly removed Chinese firms from the Panama Canal–a move encouraged by Marco Rubio. Yet Trump was not satisfied and reiterated his desire for total control of the canal. Panama had no bargaining chips left–a strategic misstep.

The notion that best captures this ambivalence of confrontation and negotiation is “contain and engage”–the coexistence of firmness and openness. For this to work, however, Brazil must take assertive steps while simultaneously pursuing negotiations across intersecting domains and with different sectors of the US government. A hybrid strategy combining elements of China’s assertiveness and Mexico’s pragmatism could be productively explored by Brazilian diplomacy. Moreover, it is essential to avoid “anchoring” the bilateral relationship in a single issue, such as tariffs or elections. Narrowing and hierarchizing the relationship around one theme reduces Brazil’s flexibility and room to maneuver.  The key to success lies in the delicate balance between force and diplomacy. The tone and tactical moves must be calibrated across all four fronts. The core argument is that full containment or retaliation against the US is politically misguided, while a policy of pure engagement–while preferable from a trade standpoint–is unlikely to be reciprocated by Washington, DC.

It is worth noting that the “confront and engage” strategy is not new. West Germany’s Ostpolitik (“Eastern policy”), led by Chancellor Willy Brandt in the 1970s, stands as one of the most sophisticated and influential foreign policy strategies to combine containment with engagement. Its chief architect, Egon Bahr, summarized the philosophy with the formula: Wandel durch Annäherung–or “change through rapprochement”. The logic of Ostpolitik was clear: to contain Soviet expansion or instability in the Eastern bloc by maintaining West Germany’s firm alignment with NATO and the European Community, while simultaneously engaging East Germany, the USSR, and Warsaw Pact countries through diplomatic recognition, non-aggression treaties, economic cooperation, and humanitarian agreements.

THE THEORY OF CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT

In his 1987 classic, John Lewis Gaddis explored the conceptual foundations and strategic dilemmas underlying US containment policy during the Cold War. He introduces the enduring paradox of strategy: the trade-off between minimizing risks and minimizing costs. According to Gaddis, this tension defines the logic of strategy and underpins decisions in grand strategy. Gaddis distinguishes between two main forms of containment: symmetrical and asymmetrical. Symmetrical containment responds to adversary challenges where and when they arise, aiming to prevent escalation but often incurring high costs. Asymmetrical containment, in contrast, allows a state to choose the time, place, and manner of response, conserving resources but accepting greater risk. Brazil’s strategy towards the Trump administration should follow the logic of asymmetrical containment.

In a review of policy options for states confronting a looming crisis, Matlary (2018) outlines four core strategic options that states may adopt when facing adversarial threats: deterrence, containment, coercion, and confrontation. Deterrence is the strategy of preventing an adversary from taking undesirable actions by signaling credible threats of retaliation. Its effectiveness lies in the adversary’s belief that the costs of action will outweigh the benefits. Containment, by contrast, is a long-term strategy aimed at limiting or neutralizing the influence of an adversary without engaging in direct confrontation. This may include diplomatic alliances, economic pressure, and military presence, all designed to prevent the spread of influence rather than force immediate compliance. Coercion goes a step further by actively seeking to compel an adversary to change behavior or halt a specific action. This can involve the threat or limited use of force, economic sanctions, or other punitive measures. Coercion is more confrontational and inherently risky–it requires not only the capability to act but also the willingness to escalate if the opponent resists. Confrontation is the final and most extreme option, involving the direct use of military force. Confrontation is often costly and unpredictable, and thus considered a last resort. 

What was missing in Matlary’s review was the concept of engagement. In turn, in a rigorous definition, Resnick (2001) argues that engagement is the attempt to influence a target state’s behavior through the comprehensive enhancement of bilateral contacts across multiple domains–diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural. Unlike appeasement, which involves ceding territory or spheres of influence, engagement aims to build interdependence and incentivize behavioral change. It is iterative, conditional, and subject to strategic withdrawal if the target fails to respond. For engagement to be effective, three conditions must be met: (1) initial low levels of bilateral contact, (2) significant material or prestige needs on the part of the target, and (3) the target must value the engager either as an adversary or a necessary partner. The dynamic between Lula and Trump makes this strategic approach particularly well-suited.

Given the costs associated with strategies of coercion or confrontation, containment appears to be a more appropriate approach for the Brazilian case. On the other hand, containment alone would be insufficient to deal with Trump, as he is a president who consistently escalates tensions and attacks, even against countries with greater means of resistance, such as China or the European Union. Moreover, containment may not be effective because it fails to generate positive incentives for Trump to view Lula’s Brazil, though perceived as an adversary, as still capable of offering political and economic benefits aligned with his immediate interests. For this reason, we advocate in this article for a dual strategy of containment and engagement. Engagement has the potential to deliver the kinds of political gains that Trump seeks in other areas of international relations.

Furthermore, the profound asymmetry between the United States and Brazil–economically, militarily, and diplomatically–makes strategies centered exclusively on confrontation, escalation, or coercion not only unrealistic but potentially damaging. In this context, engagement serves a dual purpose: it offers a framework for Brazil to preserve agency and initiative in bilateral relations, while also leveraging areas of mutual interest to avoid diplomatic isolation or economic punishment.

LULA AND TRUMP–THE FRONTS AND ACTIONS

To operationalize the “contain and engage” strategy, it is essential to disaggregate the multiple dimensions through which the Trump administration could affect Brazil. The complexity of this bilateral relationship–marked by asymmetries, ideological tensions, and overlapping political arenas–requires differentiated responses across five key domains. Rather than adopting a monolithic posture, Brazil must tailor its strategy to the specific characteristics of each front. In what follows, the analysis is structured around five critical axes–geopolitical, trade, technological/infrastructure, regional, and electoral–each of which presents distinct challenges, risks, and opportunities for calibrated action.

Geopolitical Front

On the geopolitical front, the Lula administration faces a particularly challenging landscape. The Trump administration seeks to dismantle traditional alliances and devalue multilateral institutions such as the UN, WTO, and WHO–a position that directly contradicts Brazil’s diplomatic tradition of defending multilateralism. Still, there are isolated areas of potential convergence. For example, Brazil’s stance in favor of peace negotiations in Ukraine partially aligns with Trump’s view, especially amid growing Western fatigue over the prolonged war. The US signals that Brazil could contribute peacekeeping troops, in the case of a cease-fire, represents an opportunity for Brasília to reinforce its role as an honest broker in the Ukrainian crisis–a role already acknowledged by Putin.

However, the growing tension between the US and China places Brazil in a delicate position. Brazil’s economic and diplomatic closeness to Beijing could be exploited by Trump-aligned sectors. Within the BRICS framework, Trump’s criticism of the de-dollarization agenda also presents friction. By hosting the BRICS Summit in 2025, Brazil signals that it does not intend to turn the group into an anti-Western platform; instead, it emphasizes its alignment with India and South Africa and reaffirms the group’s heterogeneity. Still, an aggressive reaction from the US could push Brazil even further toward the Asian bloc. Brazil must make it clear that it is neither allied with China nor Russia, but rather seeks economic, technological, and commercial gains within BRICS that the West is no longer able to provide. Moreover, Brazil should emphasize that, together with India and South Africa, its presence prevents the bloc from becoming an anti-West alliance. 

Climate policy is another source of significant tension with the United States. Once again, Trump has withdrawn the US from the Paris Agreement, and climate change deniers dominate the new administration. However, many domestic actors within the US–including state governments, cities, and major corporations–remain firmly committed to a progressive climate agenda. Brazilian authorities should continue to engage with these subnational and non-governmental actors to demonstrate that, alongside other pro-climate partners, Brazil remains dedicated to upholding the commitments of the Paris Agreement, regardless of federal US policy shifts. Strengthening these alliances can also signal to the Trump administration that Brazil’s climate demands have influential support within the United States itself.

The geopolitical issue that should most concern Brasília, however, is the Palestinian crisis. Brazil’s stance is perceived in Washington, DC, as clearly pro-Palestinian. Though this issue has not yet figured prominently in Brazil-US bilateral discussions, it is not implausible that, given the close relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, countries perceived as anti-Israel may eventually be targeted by the US Avoiding the contamination of bilateral relations by this topic should be a priority for Brasília, although the Bolsonarist inclination to use it against Lula could eventually be embraced by Washington DC.

In short, the geopolitical front is full of challenges, although the Ukrainian crisis may provide an opening to improve the Trump-Lula relationship. The priority must be to emphasize areas of convergence and prevent contentious issues from dominating the bilateral agenda. The other fronts–trade, regional, and electoral–could serve to relieve pressure from this more conflictual geopolitical arena.

Trade Front

On the trade front, Trump’s protectionist policies pose a direct threat to strategic sectors of the Brazilian economy, as seen in previous tariff impositions. Although Brazil was not among the primary targets of the first round of tariffs, the second wave clearly indicated the resurgence of Trumpian trade aggressiveness. This demands a coordinated and high-level response from within the Brazilian government. The internal dispute between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade (MDIC) over leadership on the tariff issue must be resolved: The Vice President should lead an integrated delegation–with technical and political backing–capable of negotiating firmly and with Itamaraty’s support.

In parallel, Brazil should actively engage with domestic US actors who stand to lose from Trump’s aggressive protectionist agenda. Key stakeholders–such as agricultural importers, industrial manufacturers dependent on Brazilian materials, and pro-trade chambers of commerce–can serve as important allies in opposing measures that harm bilateral economic relations. Many of these actors, particularly in states with strong trade ties to Brazil, have the political leverage to pressure Congress and influence the administration’s stance. By strengthening ties with these groups, Brazil can amplify its voice within the US political system and help build internal resistance to protectionist policies. This network of subnational and sectoral allies should be seen as a critical part of Brazil’s trade diplomacy toolkit under a Trump 2.0 scenario.

Brazil must combine a defensive posture–including ready-to-use retaliation tools, such as the new trade defense mechanism approved by Congress–with a continuous negotiation effort. Additionally, Brazil should challenge US tariff policies at the World Trade Organization (WTO), even if such action is largely symbolic. It would nonetheless form part of a broader multilateral pressure effort involving dozens of countries, one that Brazil should join. The idea here, however, is to avoid anchoring bilateral relations around the issue of tariffs, since Brazil is in a weaker position on this front.

Regional Front

In the regional arena, the contrast between the Bolsonaro and Lula administrations reveals a significant shift regarding the most contentious issue in the region: The Venezuelan crisis. Bolsonaro aligned fully with the “maximum pressure” policy against Venezuela, while Lula has sought to reposition Brazil as a mediator and defender of regional stability. It appears Trump will once again favor a strategy of total pressure. Nevertheless, there remains some room for coordination between the two governments on Venezuela, especially following the revocation of Chevron’s licenses–a decision influenced by Senator Marco Rubio. Lula can explore this coordination space, even indirectly, by portraying Brazil as a more moderate actor working in tandem with Washington, DC, toward a gradual political opening in Venezuela.

Another possible area of coordination between Brasília and Washington, DC is Haiti. The deteriorating situation in the country will once again require a regional response. Brazil's past experience with peacekeeping missions, combined with President Trump’s reluctance to invest in troubled neighboring countries, could strengthen Brasília’s efforts to convince US authorities that Brazil can be a valuable partner in addressing the Haitian crisis.

On the other hand, immigration has the potential to severely strain bilateral relations. Yet Lula’s recent move to create a joint working group with the US immigration system appears to be a step in the right direction. It is crucial to avoid emotional polarization over the deportation of Brazilian migrants and to ensure that the Brazilian government continues working discreetly to safeguard their basic rights. The erratic behavior of Colombia’s Gustavo Petro–who backed down after Trump’s threats–illustrates how sensitive this issue is to the new US administration. Coordinated action with Washington, DC on this sensitive immigration issue could open a valuable channel of dialogue with the Trump administration. It is important to remember that immigration is a top political priority for Trump, and any country that cooperates on this front is likely to be viewed favorably by the White House.

Combating drug cartels is another priority for the Trump administration. Although the issue is closely linked to immigration in the Trump mentality, the White House has intensified efforts to fight organized crime in Latin America, particularly in Mexico and Venezuela. During a recent visit to Brasília, a senior US official raised the idea of classifying Brazil’s PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations. This proposal was strongly rejected by the Brazilian government, as it could open the door to harsh US measures against Brazil. However, as Brazilian organized crime increasingly becomes a global phenomenon–with significant reach into Europe and the United States–the ongoing cooperation between Washington, D.C and Brasília could, and should, be expanded. This has the potential to become an important and fruitful, mutually beneficial avenue. 

The regional landscape is undoubtedly marked by growing polarization. The competition for influence within the Organization of American States (OAS)–evidenced by the election contest between the Surinamese candidate backed by Lula and the Paraguayan candidate supported by Trump–shows that there is direct rivalry between the two governments within the inter-American system. Moreover, Trump’s explicit support for Javier Milei in Argentina signals that the US intends to promote right-wing populist leaders across South America, weakening Mercosur and dividing the region. Brazil must respond with firmness but also with caution, always aiming to preserve its important relationship with Argentina. Attracting the Milei government closer to Brasília is the best antidote to Trump’s disruptive strategy in the Southern Cone.

Thus, on the regional front, two issues could help improve the bilateral relationship: Venezuela, Haiti, combating drug cartels, and immigration. Building a positive agenda with Washington, DC on these topics, especially migration, could bolster Brazil’s position on other fronts. Easing competition within the OAS and working more closely with the Milei government may also prove helpful.

Technological and Infrastructural Front

A new area of vulnerability and potential influence is the tech sector. Trump has previously sought to restrict Chinese investments in AI and data centers abroad. Brazil is becoming a battlefield in this tech war, especially as it seeks investment for its digital transformation. But on the other hand, the growing interest of the US government and American tech giants in issues such as the rare earth industry and data center investment can open a new avenue of cooperation between Brazil and the United States. 

Brazil must ensure that data centers, cloud services, and AI infrastructure are regulated by national laws and are not subject to unilateral US vetoes or surveillance attempts. At the same time, offering investment opportunities tied to public-private partnerships and digital inclusion may attract US companies on Brazil’s terms.

Another promising area for cooperation between Brasília and Washington, DC is in the rare earth industry. Brazil holds the second-largest reserve of rare earth elements in the world, second only to China. In recent years, a growing number of investments have flowed into Brazil, aiming to shift production and refining away from Chinese control. The recent financial support provided by the US administration to a Canadian rare earth operation in the state of Minas Gerais is a clear indication that Brazil has the potential to become a reliable supplier of these critical components for the tech economy. Diversifying sources of rare earth is a top priority for the Trump administration, and collaboration with Brazil could become a key instrument for advancing mutual interests and strategic cooperation.

Electoral Front

The electoral front may be the most sensitive area for the Lula administration. Trump, as a global symbol of authoritarian populism and disinformation, inspires and sustains a transnational far-right network in which the Bolsonaro family plays a key role. Alliances between figures like Steve Bannon and Bolsonarism, as well as the role of platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) under Elon Musk in disseminating anti-establishment narratives, represent direct threats to Brazilian democracy. The 2026 elections could be contaminated by fake news, efforts to delegitimize the electoral system, and coordinated attempts to undermine confidence in institutions, all fueled by the groups behind Trump’s government.

In response, Brazil must act decisively. Threats to the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) articulated by Bolsonaro and his allies must be addressed with rigor, including through international cooperation with countries facing similar threats, especially in Europe. Although the institutional defense of democracy largely rests with the judiciary, the executive branch must not remain passive. Both the rhetoric and practice of the Brazilian government must clearly communicate that external interference and attempts at destabilization will not be tolerated. In this regard, Lula’s initiatives to expand discussions on these threats with European partners–notably Macron’s France and Sánchez’s Spain–are both timely and essential.

Indeed, the electoral front is the most delicate dimension of the bilateral relationship because it directly affects the balance of power within Brazil. Here, Brazil’s stance must be uncompromising. It must not allow direct or indirect interference in its elections, and Lula should actively seek to join the anti-populist alliance currently gaining traction in Europe.

Here is a summary of the different strategies available to the Lula administration: pure containment, pure engagement, and contain-and-engage.

Table 01: Containment vs. Engagement in the Face of Trump 2.0.

Table 02. Areas of Convergence and Divergence in Brazil–US Relations under Trump.

CONCLUSIONS

It is crucial to strengthen Brazil’s representation and presence in Washington. Since the beginning of the Trump administration, President Lula has deliberately avoided direct contact with Trump and his close allies. While this approach may have been politically prudent in the domestic context, it created a vacuum that was quickly filled by Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. As a result, it is likely that Trump’s primary–if not sole–source of information about Brazil’s internal political dynamics is Eduardo Bolsonaro, who offers a highly partisan perspective.

This situation is deeply problematic and must be addressed with urgency. Relying solely on Brazil’s embassy in Washington, DC has proven insufficient to counterbalance this skewed narrative. It is therefore essential to elevate the country’s political engagement with the US by appointing a high-level interlocutor who can represent the government of President Lula with authority and clarity.

Vice President Geraldo Alckmin is well-positioned to take on this role. Empowering him as the central figure in negotiations with Washington, DC would help coordinate Brazilian demands, ensure coherent messaging, and offer a more balanced and credible view of Brazil’s current political landscape. This strategic move could also help open new channels of dialogue and restore a more institutional and constructive relationship with the United States. This will require Brazil to develop rapid response capabilities, nuanced situational assessments, and effective coordination among multiple state bodies–especially the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MDIC), the Judiciary, and the Presidency.

Brazil’s relationship with the Trump administration will require, more than ever, tactical sophistication and strategic flexibility. Faced with an unpredictable actor who combines authoritarian populism with protectionist impulses and destabilizing agendas, Brazil cannot afford to adopt either a posture of full-scale confrontation or one of submission and appeasement. The most viable–and necessary–path is one of calibrated, selective, and asymmetric action: to retaliate when needed and to engage when possible.

This cross-domain strategy of “contain and engage” is justified not only by the power asymmetry between the two countries but also by the fragmented nature of the challenges posed by Trump. In each of the five axes analyzed–geopolitical, trade, regional, technological/infrastructure and electoral–there are specific threats as well as tactical opportunities. This is not about applying a single, unified approach to the entire relationship, but about operating on multiple fronts through coordinated movements–sometimes to deter, other times to cooperate.

Geopolitically, Brazil should maintain its commitment to multipolarity by reinforcing its role as a neutral mediator, particularly in conflicts like the war in Ukraine, while avoiding excessive alignment with any great power, including China. This means resisting pressures to fully anchor its foreign policy in the BRICS, and instead using its diplomatic capital to build bridges and offer credible alternatives in multilateral forums.

On trade and regional affairs, Brazil would benefit from a posture of tactical firmness without full rupture. In commercial terms, this involves a defensive stance with readiness to retaliate against protectionist measures, combined with high-level negotiations to manage disputes. Regionally, the strategy should avoid falling into polarizing dynamics. While remaining cautious about US interference in the region, Brasília should preserve open channels for selective cooperation on shared concerns such as migration, organized crime, Haiti, and the Venezuelan crisis. This balanced approach protects national interests while preserving flexibility.

In the sensitive areas of technology and democratic resilience, the strategy requires clear principles and assertive actions. Brazil should regulate key sectors such as artificial intelligence and data infrastructure based on its own national interests, welcoming US firms. Domestically, it must take a strong stance against attempts to export MAGA-style politics by reinforcing democratic institutions and coordinating with judicial and international democratic actors. Overall, the contain and engage strategy avoids both the costs of full confrontation and the vulnerabilities of appeasement, allowing Brazil to navigate a volatile international environment with strategic autonomy.

Engagement also allows Brazil to tactically exploit internal divisions within the US political system, particularly in areas of trade and climate. By appealing to economic interests, subnational actors, or bureaucratic factions less aligned with Trump’s confrontational posture, Brazil can carve out space for pragmatic cooperation even amid presidential hostility.

By adopting a firmer stance in some areas and greater flexibility in others, Brazil can expand its room to maneuver and avoid becoming thematically anchored in sensitive areas such as trade and elections. Any form of anchoring would automatically reduce Brazil’s strategic flexibility, creating openings for cross-retaliation and escalation. Escalating tensions with a more powerful country would only damage the Brazilian economy and severely impact the domestic political landscape, as various internal actors would likely seize the opportunity to criticize and constrain President Lula. The coexistence of strength and openness is, paradoxically, the only effective way to navigate Trump’s rigidity and volatility.

More than a choice between confrontation and cooperation, Brazil’s challenge in the face of Trump 2.0 is a test of diplomatic intelligence. The strategy of confronting and engaging is, in this context, more than a clever formula–it is an imperative for institutional, economic, and democratic survival. The success of this approach will depend on the Lula government’s ability to build internal and external alliances, exploit fractures within the Trumpist camp, and sustain–amid the chaos–a coherent logic of statecraft. The art of containing without isolating, and engaging in dialogue without surrendering, will be the principal measure of Brazil’s diplomatic success in the coming years.

References

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1987. “Containment and the Logic of Strategy”. The National Interest 10: 27-38.

Matlary, Janne Haaland. 2018. Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically? Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Resnick, Evan. 2001. “Defining Engagement”. Journal of International Affairs 54 (2): 551-566.

* Translated by the author and revised by Heulwen Rowlands.

Submitted: July 13, 2025

Accepted for publication: July 16, 2025

Copyright © 2025  CEBRI-Journal.  This  is  an  Open  Access  article  distributed  under  the  terms  of  the  Creative  Commons  Attribution  License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.