Variations in the Geopolitics of the Neo-Patriotic Far-Right and the Challenge to the International Order

These pages focus on the rise of the new far-right movements as a consequence of the crisis of the international order and, at the same time, as causal agents of this crisis through their discourses and practices of institutional and normative contestation. To do so, we adopt a perspective that eclectically integrates the concepts of contestation and politicization within the neo-Gramscian critical theory of International Relations. From a causal perspective, we situate the rise of these far-right forces within a logic of mutual constitution and interaction of structural and agency factors that explain the crisis of globalization and the liberal international order. This crisis, structural or organic in nature, has had serious socioeconomic and environmental consequences, and in many countries has generated widespread discontent and disaffection with the political systems and dominant elites, delegitimizing the current order at both national and global levels. The new far-right actors and forces have responded effectively, in terms of agency, with discourses and practices of politicization and contestation of this order. Due to their ultra-sovereignist and anti-globalist nature, which we understand to be some of their essential constitutive features, we refer to these forces as "neo-patriotic far-right" (Sanahuja & López Burian 2020a). In this process of contestation, we logically observe national particularities derived from the specificities of each political system, differentiated historical trajectories, and particular political situations in each country; however, these are also part of and contribute to shaping a global historical cycle (Sanahuja 2019). Furthermore, there is a notable convergence and even coordination in their international discourses and actions, to the point that we can speak of a truly "reactionary international" (Orellana & Michelsen 2019; Sanahuja & López Burian 2020b, Orellana et al. 2023), in which, as will be highlighted, there are elements of agreement regarding the rejection of the liberal international order, but also profound differences in geopolitical matters. From this perspective, and with the aid of this toolkit, this paper demonstrates the emergence of these new far-right movements and their practices of institutional and regulatory challenge, highlighting the geopolitical variations they present as a way of contributing to the understanding of an international scenario that can be understood as an interregnum.

GLOBALIZATION CRISIS, EMERGENCE OF NEOPATRIOTS, AND RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Our analysis begins with the assumption that globalization, as a historical structure, is in crisis. Robert W. Cox's neo-Gramscian conceptualization provides a heuristic, theoretical, and methodological path for understanding this moment as an organic crisis. According to Robert W. Cox (1981), these structures are historical configurations of material capacities, ideas, and institutions that emanate from international orders. These frameworks for action constitute, situate, hierarchize, and define the interests, identity, capacities, and agency of actors. Thus, factors of agency and structure interact in historical time, generating processes of stability, conflict, and change. In each historical structure, a specific configuration of social forces, forms of the state and civil society, and world orders is present. The latter are both supported and legitimized by the norms, institutions, and organizations that constitute them. When these constitutive elements are articulated coherently, with strong structural power, they define a hegemonic world order in which human agency is limited. Profound socioeconomic changes can weaken this structural power, giving way to a non-hegemonic or interregnum stage, with broader margins for the agency of actors and the emergence of counter-hegemonic forces that question the current international order (Sanahuja 2020; 2024).  

Antonio Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks [ 1 ], written in prison under Italian fascism, referred to his time as an interregnum, originating in the organic crisis of interwar capitalism, the crisis of liberalism, the rise of fascism, and the challenge to the international order of the time, which would ultimately lead to war. It represented a crisis of hegemony, of elites and their authority, as well as the existing consensus and its legitimacy. In the absence of consent, power could only be maintained through coercion, without allowing the maintenance of a decaying order, with “morbid symptoms,” according to the Gramscian metaphor, of societal scope. These phenomena include the questioning of traditional elites due to widespread disaffection and discontent, the rise of extremism and authoritarian leadership, and different forms of Caesarism (Achcar 2021; Sanahuja 2024).

Organic crisis and interregnum are phenomena that can only be defined by historical context. However, if the interwar period constituted an interregnum and a period of crisis of hegemony, the period that began with the 2008 financial crisis, by identifying a historical milestone, can also be interpreted as a period of organic crisis and interregnum, marked by the crisis of globalization, understood as a historical structure. This crisis, originating in a highly financialized, transnationalized, and digital global economy, and in which major transformations in the productive and technological spheres can be observed, exposed the contradictions and limits (economic, social, environmental, and political governance) of the international order, the forms of the State, and civil society, while also creating a scenario for the emergence of contesting actors. 

This has opened a non-hegemonic historical period, where the scope for agency of actors challenging the previous order is greater, both nationally and internationally. Social situations of inequality, precariousness, lack of protection, dissatisfaction, and fear of the future, linked to this great economic and productive transformation, generated citizen unrest that manifested itself in political disaffection and criticism of forms of representation and political decision-making, both nationally and internationally. This context, which combines socioeconomic and sociocultural factors, has facilitated the emergence of far-right political entrepreneurs, who have managed to establish themselves as agents of great political relevance (Norris & Inglehart 2019; Scheiring et al. 2024). 

The new neo-patriotic far-right, a product of this era, can be understood as a global phenomenon, but with national specificities rooted in the contexts and historical trajectories of each case. They are defined by a double split: the left-right axis, on which they occupy ultra-conservative positions; and the axis that defines their position on the crisis of globalization, confronting cosmopolitanism and liberal internationalism from nationalist and sovereignist positions. Along this latter axis, their unifying characteristic is their opposition to the liberal international order and to what they call "globalism," which they define, strategically, in a vague manner. Under this common denominator, the new neo-patriotic far-right is resistant to a series of values, norms, and institutions, both nationally and internationally. At times, they opt for populist strategies and discourses, this being a defining but not constitutive trait. For this reason, this confrontation is often expressed in terms of a "cultural battle," contradicting an agenda that they consider imposed by unelected transnational elites and implemented with the "connivance" of their local "accomplices" whom they label as a "caste," or to which they contrast an idea of "people" that is generally restrictive and, in Europe and the United States, due to migration, of a nativist nature. 

Their definition as far-right groups is manifested in their vindication of a social order they characterize as traditional or natural, thus promoting hierarchical structures that preserve inequalities based on class, ethnicity, and gender. From this anti-globalist far-right political framework, neo-patriots combine discourses and practices of contestation of the liberal international order through the (re)politicization of issues, within a logic of political and sociocultural polarization. Thus, from positions ranging from sovereign nationalism to libertarian individualism, they challenge multilateralism and processes of integration, regionalism, and regional cooperation, promoting visions that contain discourses based on geopolitics and the bilateralization of international relations. They question cosmopolitan values, open societies, and various expressions of diversity promotion, challenging agendas that range from social justice and human rights to gender issues and migration policies. They even, with narratives of a "plebeian" tone, question regional and global governance on issues such as the environment and health. This latter case is recognizable in the discourse and practices of governments led by neo-patriots such as Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Although its meaning may be broader (Everts & Ekman  2024), to understand these processes, we rely, first of all, on the concept and theory of contestation. This approach to understanding the phenomenon, borrowed from social constructivism in International Relations, aims to comprehend and explain how the processes of questioning international norms and institutions operate (Wiener 2014; 2017; Orchard & Wiener 2023). Contestation, according to Antje Wiener, can be defined as “the set of social practices that discursively express the disapproval of norms” (Wiener 2017, 112), whether by questioning their legitimacy, by origin or foundations, by the actors who promote them, or by their substantive content. While contestation can be a democratic practice, by leading to deliberative processes in pluralistic contexts that allow for adjustments to norms, it can also generate a crisis of those norms. 

This contestation can target both fundamental norms, which involve values such as the desirability of multilateral governance, as well as the organizing principles of its forms of representation and decision-making. Regardless of the types of norms being challenged, Wiener distinguishes three forms of contestation: reactive, which involves non-compliance with the norm; proactive, which involves a critical commitment to modifying it; and interpretive, which affects the understanding of its meaning (Wiener 2017). In turn, these types of contestation can be carried out through four strategies: arbitration, deliberation, justification, and containment. Neo-patriots favor the latter, as it entails the implementation of confrontational actions and discourses that deny the validity of the norm, generating non-cooperative dynamics where consensus or even compromise become unviable options. 

Along with this perspective, we also turn to the concept of politicization, used in post-functionalist theory on European integration, to understand how norms and institutions are placed at the center of political conflict as part of this contestation of the international order (Hooghe & Marks 2009; Zürn 2014; Hooghe et al. 2019). As in the case of contestation, this concept allows us to highlight agency factors, identifying the positions taken by these far-right groups of “anti-entrepreneurship” and normative “sabotage” (Bloomfield 2016; Schneiker 2021). As Hooghe and Marks (2009) point out, politicization, understood as the expansion of conflict within the political system, leads to questions and disputes over issues, norms or institutions on which there was a consensus. To this end, an issue, norm, or institution is identified that is assumed to be given or established and is given prominence from its ideational matrix. This is the basis for discourses and actions that generate activation and mobilization dynamics through political polarization (Grande & Hunter 2016, 7). Neo-patriots use these strategies, in an ideologized way, to challenge the legitimacy of origin, processes, and results of international organizations (Hooghe et al. 2019).

Six thematic nodes of the international agenda can be identified, which neo-patriots place in the social and political debate, questioning the established consensus. We develop them succinctly below, without their ordering implying a prior hierarchy in political confrontation, since the importance of each one will depend on each moment or place. 

The first refers to democratic values, norms, and institutions, particularly the rule of law and the balance of power. Neo-patriots advocate for various kinds of authoritarian practices. They range from plebiscitary practices that, with populist rhetoric, question forms of representation, to political strategies that, in the name of the nation, community, or security, undermine the separation of powers or the guarantees of civil and political liberties. In some cases, they project this hierarchical and authoritarian conception through punitive, militaristic, and securitizing policies regarding social affairs.  

A second set of contested issues affects the norms and institutions related to international trade and investment. It involves the rejection of the external constitutionalization of trade and investment rules under international law–one of the constitutive features of globalization–regardless of whether those rules are those of the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional trade agreements, or treaties on investment liberalization and protection. This rejection is justified with rhetoric based on sovereign nationalism, including arguments of national security, or on ultraliberal libertarian principles. However, this rejection or challenge to the (neoliberal) norms of the international economic order can lead to very different policy matrices. In some cases, these may be protectionist trade policies, the protection of strategic sectors from foreign investment considered hostile, or ultraliberal policies of unilateral market opening. 

The third node is constructed of agendas related to public goods, such as the environment or health. In environmental matters, the contestation focuses on climate change, the energy transition, biodiversity protection, and other related issues. Sometimes, the contestation stems from national sovereignty appeals focused on economic growth; in other cases, it arises from a libertarian perspective that radically emphasizes individual freedoms as the center of its arguments. It also entails a rejection of expert knowledge and scientific knowledge, which is equally evident in matters of public health. This last issue gained prominence with the COVID-19 pandemic, in which the neo-patriotic far-right managed to mobilize broad sectors by questioning the restrictions on individual freedoms and economic activity adopted by many governments to stem the wave of infections during the most acute phase of the pandemic, politicizing lockdowns or the use of masks, and subsequently showing reluctance to support vaccination campaigns. International cooperation in this area was also challenged. 

The fourth set of themes concerns norms and institutions related to human rights, particularly in matters of gender equality and sexual diversity. From open confrontation with feminisms and the recognition of the rights and identity of LGBTQI+ people–and everything they call "gender ideology"–to the vindication of "traditional" values and the family, these actors also use these issues as tools of (re)politicization, polarization, and "cultural battle" in spaces such as social policy, educational institutions, healthcare, and the rules of daily coexistence.  

The fifth node refers to norms and understandings about migration. They are based on security-based discourses that present migration as a threat to employment and well-being, to the community, the nation, and its identity, or, sometimes, under a "reverse pseudo-feminism" that seeks to defend Western women from the practices and traditions of other traditional societies. With positions suspicious of multiculturalism and diversity, in the United States and Europe, they often adopt nativist, openly Islamophobic, or racist positions. These latter positions are not observed in other contexts, such as Latin America, where the rejection of migration primarily incorporates arguments, also present in the previous cases, ranging from the criminalization of migrants to formulas of welfare chauvinism.

The sixth node refers to geopolitical and international political economy positions and alignments. They revolve around the liberal international order itself and the very notion of the West and its elites, and their hegemony that sustains that order. The common element is the questioning of the norms and institutions of the liberal international order and, in ideological terms, of liberal internationalism in its post-Cold War and globalization periods. As in the areas of trade and investment, aggressive anti-globalist rhetoric challenges multilateral and regional norms and agreements, particularly those of the United Nations system and, in the European case, the European Union (EU) itself, as well as the federalist visions of this regional organization. The discourses and actions of neo-patriots challenge multilateralism and regional processes of integration, regionalism, and cooperation, combining this with a highly ideologized rhetoric that views international relations as bilateral and transactional, enabling a geopolitics based on notions of power and promoting ultra-conservative values. However, among neo-patriots, there are divergent positions regarding Western hegemony, its values, and institutions, as well as geopolitical alignments, as illustrated by the antagonistic positions these forces have adopted regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the genocide in Gaza. In the European case, as mentioned below, there is a visible divide between Atlanticists and Eurasianists, the latter led by Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party, which is a key factor explaining the far-right's division in regional politics and the European Parliament. In the United States, Trump's sovereignist stance distances him from the Atlantic Alliance and Europe, and his position on the war in Ukraine is more favorable to Russia. Finally, the far right has adopted a closed position of support for Israel and the "ultra" Likud government and its allies, led by Binyamin Netanyahu.     

Despite these fractures, a visible network of relationships among neo-patriots can be understood as a form of reactionary internationalism (Orellana & Michelsen 2019; Sanahuja & López Burian 2020b). Orellana and Michelsen (2019) point out that this reactionary internationalism reconceptualizes the international through discourses and actions that challenge issues, norms, and practices of the liberal international order. Networks of think tanks, the circulation of ideas, meetings, international articulations, party networks, and common political platforms are part of a reactionary internationalism that understands politics as conflict, evoking the Schmittian friend-enemy matrix (Sanahuja & López Burian 2020b; 2022; 2023). Despite their common denominator, anti-globalism, these new far-right movements do not share a unified vision in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms about the international order they seek to build. In this way, his answer shows variations that are worth noting.

Variations in the Geopolitics of the Neo-Patriot Far Right: Three Case Studies  

To illustrate the variations in the neo-patriotic contestation of the liberal international order in the current context, marked by elections in Europe and the United States and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, this section examines the geopolitical and geo-economic visions of the neo-patriotic far-right in the United States, the EU, and Latin America. This brief analysis draws on several key texts: the “2025 Project” of the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation in the United States; Viktor Orbán's speech at the 33rd Bálványos Summer University in July 2024; and Javier Milei's lecture at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January of that same year.  

Donald Trump's presidency marked a visible shift in United States foreign policy, the keystone of which has been opposition to globalization and multilateralism, and the challenge to liberal internationalism and the North Atlantic bond. With different variations–neocon hegemony and liberal interventionism, among others–this vision had marked the post-Cold War and the governance of globalization, and had been embraced by both Democratic and Republican administrations. In a short period of time, unilaterally and with strong sovereigntist and anti-globalist rhetoric, Trump challenged the multilateral trade regime with protectionist policies, blocking the WTO and initiating trade and technology wars with China and other partners. In fact, one feature of the radicalization or "Trumpization" of the Republican Party is the abandonment of its traditionally liberal vision of trade policy. The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNESCO, and the Human Rights Council, which were later reversed by Biden, were part of a broader policy of opposition to the United Nations and multilateralism on key issues for the neo-patriots. Added to this was the hardening of immigration policy, which marked relations with Mexico. Trump also questioned the United States' commitment to NATO and security in Europe, abandoning key arms control and limitation agreements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), making the Indo-Pacific and the confrontation with China a strategic priority. The assault on the Capitol by extremist mobs, instigated by the outgoing president to invalidate the election results, also highlighted the risks that Trumpism poses to democracy and the rule of law. 

This anti-globalist shift and opposition to liberal internationalism, to the extent that it redefines the United States' role in the world, generated a heated debate within Trumpism and the Republican Party, which has largely revolved around the war in Ukraine and relations with Europe and Russia since 2022. In this debate, three broad positions can be identified (Belin et al. 2024): a) the restrainers, focused on the domestic agenda and with isolationist tendencies; b) the "prioritizers," who call for a focus on Asia and the confrontation with China; and c) the "primacists," who advocate maintaining the primacy of the United States on a global scale. The first two groups agree on China's priority, oppose maintaining the North Atlantic commitment, leaving Europe's security in the hands of the Europeans, and oppose aid to Ukraine, as was already evident in Congress in 2024, thus forcing a peace agreement that would favor Russia. However, all three tendencies are markedly unilateralist and represent a clear rejection of multilateralism and the "rules-based international order" of liberal internationalism, of which the United States had been the main proponent (Walt 2024).

The extensive "Mandate for Leadership," a key piece of the Heritage Foundation's so-called 2025 Project, defines the main lines of "conservative" policy–the term used in the United States by which these new neo-patriotic right-wing groups define themselves–in the face of a new Trump presidency. Much of the attention is directed at the federal government, state agencies, and the administration's technical and career staff. "The problem comes from within." Referring to the Departments of Defense and State, the focus is on an establishment that considers itself "mostly leftist," subordinate to "woke" agendas and "social engineering" (critical race theory, equality, feminism, LGBTQ+, climate) that are alien to the national interest and the defense of the United States. During Trump's first term, the establishment conspired against his policies and made decisions independently, defining foreign and defense policy outside of the president-elect. The radical and highly ideologized proposal is an immediate and widespread purge of the civil service and the foreign service, replacing that personnel with conservative political appointees. To this end, Project 2025 proposes creating a database ⎯a “conservative LinkedIn”⎯ that would allow any ordinary person with that political orientation to access positions in the administration (Dans & Groves 2023, xiv, 88).

Regarding economic policy, the challenge to globalization is clear: “For several decades, establishment “elites” have failed the citizens by refusing to control borders, outsourcing manufacturing to China and elsewhere, spending recklessly, regulating constantly, and ultimately controlling the country from the top down rather than letting it flourish from the bottom up” (Dans & Groves 2023, 657). However, Project 2025 does not have an unequivocal answer: some of the contributions advocate free trade with all nations; But the one closest to Trump, drafted by Peter Navarro, who was his presidential advisor, proposes a protectionist trade policy, opposed to offshoring, oriented towards the recovery of manufacturing and the defense industry, belligerent towards alleged espionage and industrial piracy in China, and refractory to WTO rules, which allowed an “unfair, unbalanced and non-reciprocal” relationship with that country, with which the United States must seek economic decoupling.

Project 2025 subordinates foreign policy to the security framework of national defense. It defines China and its expansionist policy in Asia as the main danger, advocating a defensive strategy (denial defense) that makes the control and/or subordination of Taiwan and other countries in the region unviable, "at whatever cost the Americans are willing to assume." The document does not endorse the radical position of Republican sectors, sometimes endorsed  by Trump, that advocates leaving NATO, but it does propose that security in Europe and deterrence against Russia be assumed by the Europeans themselves, leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which must be modernized, as a last resort. It considers migration control a central issue of foreign policy and proposes a rigorous re-evaluation of "who is friend and enemy." In addition to China, which is "more of a threat than a competitor," the attention and energy of U.S. foreign policy should focus on Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea. Project 2025 recognizes that the war in Ukraine and the relationship with Russia is an issue that “divides conservatives,” and part of that movement, as mentioned, advocates forcing a deal with Russia and leaving that issue to the Europeans (Dan & Groves 2023, 181). 

The sovereignist and security-based approach of Project 2025 is projected toward Latin America, where it calls for a "local security" approach–a support for the "bukelization" of its policies?–and particularly toward Mexico, considered "a national security disaster" that "has lost its functional sovereignty to drug cartels." It proposes a "sovereign Mexico" and a "fentanyl-free" border–an issue in which, once again, the threat of China is pointed out–and, on the economic front, the commitment is to productive relocation to the Latin American neighborhood (re-shoring or "re-hemisphering ") functional to decoupling with China. 

As in Trump's first phase, Project 2025 calls for the withdrawal of major international treaties and informal agreements deemed harmful to national sovereignty and imposing high costs, and for an end to "blind support for international organizations," considering the withdrawal of those that do not respond to the national interest of the United States. It particularly questions these organizations' promotion of "radical social policies as if they were human rights priorities," demanding that they reorient themselves toward "promoting a healthy culture of respect for life, family, and sovereignty" as "foundations of human society and 'true human rights,'" with an express rejection of abortion and "the limitation of human rights in the name of health" (Dan & Groves 2023, 191).         

On the other hand, the June 2024 European Parliament elections have marked a significant advance of the far right. The leading force in six countries–including France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria–and the second largest in six others–including Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands–they could be the largest parliamentary group if they were a unified force. But they are not, and their differing geopolitical visions are perhaps the most critical dividing factor. Part of the European far right, organized in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, led by Georgia Meloni of Fratelli d'Italia , opted for a governing coalition with the European People's Party (EPP). Its Atlanticist orientation, in a regional context dominated by the war in Ukraine, facilitated this convergence and, in turn, served as cover for the "normalization" of the far right vis-à-vis the EPP. This strategy failed, given the results of the national elections in Spain, France, and Poland, and the results of the European elections. Finally, the centrist coalition of liberals, social democrats and EPP that governed the European institutions in the previous cycle was renewed, this time with the support of the Greens, which the latter justified, in part, by the need to block the far right (Forti 2024).

In the meantime, a major reorganization of European far-right forces with Eurasianist and, in some cases, openly pro-Russian geopolitical visions took place, promoted by Hungarian President Viktor Orbán. Shortly after the European elections, coinciding with the start of the Hungarian presidency of the EU Council on June 30, 2024, the new group "Patriots for Europe" was formed. It brings together, among others, Orbán's party, Fidesz; Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National (RN); Matteo Salvini's League; the Austrian FPÖ; the Danish People's Party; Chega! of Portugal; Geert Wilders' Freedom Party in the Netherlands; and the Spanish Vox. As Forti (2024) points out, "Orbán's move changed the entire playing field," leaving Meloni and CRE in a bad position. With 84 seats, Patriots for Europe is the third largest group in the European Parliament and, through Vox, could be key in coordinating the neo-patriotic far-right in Europe and Latin America.

Orbán's lecture at the Tusványós Festival in July 2024, mentioned above, offers an updated synthesis of Fidesz’s geopolitical vision and, in many respects, of Patriots for Europe. His anti-Western and Eurasianist approach has a long intellectual tradition and is rooted, among other things, in Hungarian Turanism and the civilizational geopolitics of the Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin (Pereyra Doval 2023). In an explicit reference to alt-right narratives (Osella  2021, 83), Orbán (2024) notes that the war in Ukraine is the “red pill” that, like in the movie The Matrix, allows us to see the reality of global (geo)politics. For Orbán, the West is in decline and undergoing a process of self-destruction, originating in May 1968 and driven by individualism and its supposed post-national status, which has led to the abandonment of the essential connection with God, homeland, and family. The decline of the West corresponds to the inevitable rise of Asia, and corresponds to the emergence of a new non-Western modernity and the "global rejection of Western values," the central expression of which, according to Orbán, is today the LGBTQ+ community. According to Orbán, Putin's main weapon–and the reason for his supposed global leadership–is to oppose and resist the Western imposition of LGBTQ+ morality, concluding that "the soft power of the West has been replaced by the soft power of Russia," and that, for this reason, "the whole world is aligning itself with Russia."

The post-national conception of the West and Western Europe clashes with the importance that Central and Eastern Europe place on the nation-state and the essentialist conception of the nation characteristic of the far right. “In our conception,” Orbán asserts, “the world is composed of nation-states with full sovereignty and autonomy in their domestic sphere, and that is the condition for world peace.” Nation-states, in turn, are based on a particular culture, shared values, a historical trajectory, and “anthropological depth,” and from these emanate inescapable moral imperatives. For the EU, however, nation-states are historical and contingent creations that, just as they came, can go… And if anything calls into question the ethnic homogeneity of the nation, it is migration, which for Orbán “is the essence of progressive liberal internationalism.” The dissolution of the country in the face of migration and of national sovereignty in the EU's federalist project, therefore, represents a fundamental danger. In this view, the EU would be the quintessence of late-Western democracies: elitist, oligarchic, globalist, and ultimately anti-democratic. Brussels, according to Orbán, would be occupied by a transatlantic, globalist liberal oligarchy, against which Patriots for Europe must rise. These elites characterize the legitimate demands of the people as "xenophobia, homophobia, and nationalism." This justifies a policy that pits the "true" people against the globalist elites. "This is the defining phenomenon of Western politics today," Orbán asserts.

These elites, according to Orbán, have turned Europe into a vassal of the Democrats in the United States. Orbán clearly differentiates them from Trump's sovereigntist and isolationist policies, with which he identifies. Despite the ideological affinity with the far right in Poland, Orbán describes that country, as well as its Nordic and Baltic allies, as a forward base for the United States against Russia, which has broken the once related Visegrad Group. In response, he proposes a Hungarian strategy of Eurasian connectivity, as defined by his advisor Balasz Orbán (2024) [ 2 ], and for Europe, a greater “strategic autonomy” to prevent its decline and end up as an “open-air museum”. This would involve rebuilding its productive capacity and building a European defense industry, abandoning Ukraine, arguing that it is neither opportune nor sufficient resources to accommodate its integration into the EU or NATO, and reconciling with Russia, whose energy is needed for this autonomous project. After the start of Hungary's presidency of the EU Council, in open rebellion against the European institutions, Orbán embarked on a "peace mission" with visits to Kiev, Moscow, and Beijing, which he considered a failure due to the lack of conditions for a negotiated peace (Sahuquillo & Gómez 2024).    

A third variant of the response to globalization, the international economic order, and globalism can be seen in a Latin American case, through the speech Argentine President Javier Milei gave to the financial elites gathered in January 2024 at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Various media outlets echoed the stupor caused by this speech, as harsh as it was doctrinaire, superficial, and fallacious (Cue & Criales 2024). Still, at the same time, it appealed to a possible future of authoritarian capitalism as a dystopian solution to the interregnum originating in the crisis of globalization and its liberal cosmopolitan governance. Milei's message, launched precisely in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the supposed globalist elites reviled by the neo-patriotic far-right, could not be more forceful: "The West is in danger (...) because those who are supposed to defend the values of the West find themselves co-opted by a worldview that inexorably leads to socialism and, consequently, to poverty" (Milei 2024). 

In fact, since the 2008 crisis, Davos has become one of the main global forums for discussing the need for an enlightened and more inclusive capitalism, environmental sustainability, and the renewal of the social contract. Milei has another interpretation: the main leaders of the West are part of a "privileged caste" that has abandoned freedom in the name of collectivism, attracted by the moral and social justice discourses of "the doxa of the left," when capitalism is, per se, virtuous because its unhindered functioning generates well-being and promotes world peace. The West's essential problem, according to Milei, is that it must confront not only socialists, but its own leaders, thinkers, and academics, whose flawed theoretical framework–neoclassical economics–by assuming supposed market failures (oligopolistic concentration, negative externalities, public goods, asymmetric information, coordination failures, etc.) would give way "to public regulation, state interference, socialism, the degradation of society, and poverty." In reality, Milei asserted, in the various forms of Western government, "there are no substantive differences. Socialists, conservatives, communists, fascists, Nazis, social democrats, centrists. They are all the same." And he adds that the economic failure of the collectivists and socialists forced them to change their agenda, abandoning the class struggle and replacing it with other harmful "supposed social conflicts," such as the "ridiculous and unnatural struggle" between men and women, or the environmental agenda, which, according to Milei's peculiar interpretation, leads to birth control or abortion. The latter, moreover, is an unjust act of rich countries, which, after having exploited their resources, now try to prevent the poor from doing so. 

Through these agendas, those Milei calls "neo-Marxists" have managed to co-opt Western common sense through the media, culture, universities, and international organizations, with the latter having greater influence in influencing government policies. 

In short, Milei's counter-argument is situated within a framework of radical libertarian economic policy, which challenges state regulation and international norms, and within a foreign policy marked by unconditional alignment with the far right in the United States and Israel. It also involves questioning China and the BRICS, reversing the previous government's decision to join that group, despite the fact that China is both the destination and origin of most of Argentina's foreign trade. According to Juan Gabriel Tokatlian (2024), this would be a "hyper-Westernist" policy. However, the West that Milei defends never existed, and exists only in his imagination: an Arcadia that is both libertarian in economic terms and ultra-conservative in the civic and moral spheres. In reality, it can be interpreted as a form of "subaltern response" aligned with the United States–more with a future Trump administration and activist businessmen like Elon Musk than with the liberal internationalism of the Biden administration–in its rejection of China, and contrary to the country's economic interests.  

CONCLUSIONS

The rise of the neo-patriotic far-right, situated at the intersection of ideology and the crisis of globalization, has given rise to a global cycle of discourses and practices of institutional and normative contestation in which, in the name of anti-globalism, the liberal international order and its institutions and norms are challenged, as well as the elites who have been responsible for its governance, legitimation, and reproduction. Combining theoretical elements from the neo-Gramscian approach to international political economy, contestation theory, and the concept of politicization, this paper highlights the causal factors, in terms of agency and structure, the common patterns, and the thematic nodes that articulate these discourses and practices of contestation. 

These neo-patriotic far-right movements are part of a "reactionary international" that shares arguments, discourses, and formal and informal organizational networks, as well as the common purpose of challenging the current order in the name of sovereignty, the "people," or a libertarian vision of the individual versus society. However, this common framework does not prefigure automatic alignments or common positions in the global geopolitical dispute. The cases of the United States and Project 2025, which seeks to shape Trumpism 2.0; the position of Víctor Orbán, who leads the new Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament; and the libertarian vision and subaltern contestation of Javier Milei in Argentina illustrate differentiated and even antagonistic positions, which are partly situated in the cleavage between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, or between primacy and isolationism. With this preliminary examination, which requires a broader study and a larger number of cases, we open a research agenda on the geopolitics of the neo-patriotic far right and its effects on the reconfiguration of the international system and the global political economy, at a time of organic crisis and interregnum, and worsening global risks. 

Notes

[1]Gramsci was imprisoned from 1926 to 1937. The work we are referring to was written between 1929 and 1935.

[2]No relation to Viktor Orbán.

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Received: August 27, 2024

Accepted for publication: September 4, 2024

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