O governo brasileiro de Lula diante da guerra de Gaza: uma postura previsível em um contexto radicalizado

It is not difficult to anticipate the position that Lula’s third Brazilian administration (2023-) would take on the Gaza War, given that his working team resembles–although with some nuanced differences–his diplomatic team during his first two terms in office (2003-2010) (Brun 2012). Moreover, the case of Palestine and the creation of a Palestinian State is a cause traditionally supported by his party, the Workers’ Party (PT). Shortly before leaving power in December 2010, Lula’s government recognized Palestine as a State with the pre-1967 borders (adhering to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, UNGA). A majority of the South American countries followed this decision, confirming the importance of the issue for the Latin American left^[1] as a legacy of the anticolonial struggle and the ongoing defense of self-determination for the Palestinian people (Baeza 2012). 

In line with his promise of rupture during his administration, Jair Bolsonaro reoriented Brazilian foreign policy concerning the Israel-Palestinian conflict, firmly supporting Israel. Beyond closer bilateral ties, this stance can be explained by several domestic factors. The military increased its influence during Bolsonaro's Presidency and fostered cooperation with Israel on security issues. This Brazilian government also benefited from the support of multiple evangelical groups, eager to defend Israel out of religious motivations. As an illustration of these influences, Jair Bolsonaro tried to move the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. His attempt did not materialize thanks to the pressure exerted by some Muslim countries, which threatened to restrict their food imports from Brazil. The agribusiness sector, another significant supporter of the government, was alerted and the President decided not to implement his election promise (Casarões & Sochaczewski 2022; Ribeiro & Milani 2019).

Taking these factors into account, the current Lula administration's critical stance towards Israel since the end of October does not come as a surprise. However, it was not adopted in the same way or under the same circumstances as in previous mandates. It is predictable but is taking place in different and radicalized environments, both domestically and internationally. Therefore, its effects are not the same, either.

I will defend this argument based on two factors that illustrate the contextual differences: Brazil's participation in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2022 and 2023, and the more present and better-organized voice of the far-right in Brazil, particularly its evangelical branch. In addition, President Lula's controversial statement before the African Union in February 2024, when he compared Israel's actions in Gaza to Nazism, deserves specific scrutiny, because it reflects the complexities of Brazilian society today. I will begin by delving into some fundamental elements of the development of Brazil's foreign policy since 2023. I base my reflection on the analysis of documents and official statements; monitoring of the press and social networks, in particular, X (formerly Twitter); and a dozen interviews with diplomatic personnel that I had the opportunity to conduct in Brasilia in December 2023^[2]. 

THE HEADS OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE COMEBACK OF LULA’S BASTIONS

Brazil’s foreign policy has undergone an evolution marked in recent years by the relatively less central weight of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty, in its design and implementation. Its main role, according to the people interviewed, is to coordinate domestic actors and disseminate the country’s international policies and obligations to domestic institutions. What is certain is that for international crisis management Itamaraty still has certain advantages due to its knowledge of cases and international law.

The current Lula administration is organized around three institutions that manage foreign policy. First, the President of the Republic himself is known for his interest in foreign affairs and his activism in this area. During interviews, the decisive role of the leader was consistently emphasized. His ambition for leadership and international recognition–which encourages critical stances–may clash with his role as Head of State–who is accountable for his actions and has a duty of representation (Lima & Ives 2024). Second, the Special Advisory to the President is a group of diplomats, academics, and experts, headed by Celso Amorim, who was Brazil's Foreign Minister during Lula's first two terms in office^[3]. The Advisor’s Office usually adopts a low-key public profile, except to support the President at critical moments (Sadi 2024). However, its influence is significant for an understanding of Brazil’s diplomatic orientation. Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also involved through meetings with counterparts and frequent communiqués. The Ministry is led by Mauro Vieira, who had already been Minister in 2015 and 2016 under Dilma Rousseff. The Minister maintains a moderate profile, less assertive than that of Celso Amorim when he was in this position, and his group of advisors has strong connections with pro-Lula groups within Itamaraty.

In terms of objectives, Lula's government wants to make a clear distinction from those of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to recover “Brazil's prestige” (Bueno & Abellán 2021) and demonstrate its return to the global scene after several years of withdrawal. Two initiatives fall within this perspective. First, since the beginning of 2023, there have been substantial personnel changes in high-ranking Itamaraty positions. The aim is to erase traces of the previous presidential term and align the Ministry with presidential guidelines and the networks of Minister Vieira, as in the case of the Brazilian ambassador to Israel, Frederico Meyer (GZH 2024).

Secondly, the presidential intention to relaunch the activism that characterized his first terms in office is explicit, with an increase in international commitments (Presidency of the G20 in 2024, organization of the COP30 in Belém in 2025) and official visits–among which the visit to Egypt and Ethiopia in February 2024 is important for our case study. Therefore, for the current government, Brazilian visibility on international agenda issues, such as the Gaza war, is key. Initially, Middle East issues were not a priority, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given its gravity and symbolism, imposed itself on Brazilian foreign policy. Moreover, it is an issue that highlights the differentiation from Jair Bolsonaro, who adopted a pro-Israel stance (Casarões & Sochaczewski 2022). These elements substantiate the analysis of the Brazilian positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that flared up again on October 7, 2023.

AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT THAT URGED MODERATION AND THEN RADICALIZATION

At the international level, the Brazilian position has evolved from an initial short two-week period of moderate reactions that has rapidly been replaced since the end of October by statements that are explicitly critical of Israel.

It should be recalled that, despite this evolution, the Brazilian authorities have, from the outset, repeatedly condemned the Hamas attacks of October 7. However, I note some imprecision about the relevance of using the term “terrorist” to describe them. Brazil has had legislation on terrorism since 2016, but there is much debate in the country about the appropriateness of taking up this mobilizing rhetoric. During my interviews, certain diplomats explicitly refused to use the term and justified this refusal, while others did use it. This indicates a lack of coordination and makes Brazil’s position confusing in this regard.

Brazil has had legislation on terrorism since 2016, but there is much debate in the country about the appropriateness of taking up this mobilizing rhetoric. During my interviews, certain diplomats explicitly refused to use the term and justified this refusal, while others did use it. This indicates a lack of coordination and makes Brazil’s position confusing in this regard.

How to understand this first moment of moderation and its evolution? To begin with, there were Brazilian nationals living in the affected territories, and the authorities had to organize repatriation flights (Rodrigues 2023). One of the Hamas hostages had Brazilian nationality (Carta Capital 2023). The need to protect Brazilian nationals meant that Brazil had to assume moderate positions. It was also expedient to facilitate the Qatari mediation on the issue at that time.

Moreover, in the first days after October 7, governments around the world mostly reacted in favor of Israel. This reaction can be understood as that of a community of actors, representing States, in solidarity with one of its members attacked by a non-State actor. This was an instantaneous first reaction of support similar to that of September 11, 2001. Let us recall that at that time the community of States overwhelmingly supported the idea of intervening in Afghanistan as a response.

The first instance of moderation is also due to a circumstantial coincidence. In 2022 and 2023, Brazil was an elected member of the UNSC, and in October of the latter year held the Presidency of the body. The country holding the Presidency, in addition to carrying the current agenda, can include certain issues that seem relevant to it in the discussion and has a coordinating role in the event of a crisis outbreak. The October 7 attacks were consequential for the Brazilian Presidency of the UNSC. Brazil was in charge of drafting a resolution in a very volatile context on the ground and unproductive in the institution, due to the war in Ukraine and tensions between China and the United States. The Brazilian representatives managed to convince some actors who had bad relations among them to support the resolution, while two abstained (Great Britain and Russia). Only the United States vetoed it (Chade 2023). The resolution focused on the humanitarian issue and the need to ensure safe corridors to route aid to Gaza.

Since the failure of the resolution project, the intensification of the Israeli military reaction, the end of the UNSC Presidency, and the end of the Brazilian mandate (replaced by Guyana), we have observed an increasingly openly critical position towards Israel, in particular from President Lula. For example, the vote on the Brazilian resolution took place on October 18, and just a week later, on the 25th, Lula mentioned publicly for the first time that the issues in Gaza resembled genocide (Verdélio 2023).

Brazil has voted in favor of various resolutions in the UNGA and supported several other initiatives, such as the South African initiative before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the hearing requested by the UNGA before the same court (a request that was being made months earlier and which the Bolsonaro government did not support), and the debates in the UN Human Rights Council. Its positions are based on a mixture of defense of international law and support for the Palestinian cause.

In short, concerning the international context, the initial moderation of the Brazilian representatives is understandable due to specific circumstances, which became more nuanced and eventually nullified as the weeks went by. Faced with the intensity of the Israeli reaction, President Lula adopted both a more traditional critical rhetoric, taking into account his diplomatic orientation on this conflict, and a more radical one, by mentioning the word "genocide." This stance also fueled internal polarization in Brazil.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN BRAZIL

Another substantial change compared to Lula’s first two terms is the use of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in Brazil for domestic purposes. This issue has become an additional element that feeds internal polarization, increasingly acute since the Lava-Jato anti-corruption operation launched in 2014 and the controversial impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016. This statement does not mean that there were no previous differentiated, even opposing, visions in Brazil on this conflict, but these did not come to represent a divisive factor in internal politics. In this sense, the political use of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been accentuated both by the far-right and by the government in office.

There are Jewish and Arab communities in Brazil, but at this time they do not seem to be the Brazilian actors with the most influential voices regarding the Gaza war. This is due to their relative size; the Jewish community numbers about 120.000 in Brazil (which has a population of circa 214 million). The Arab community is larger but mostly composed of Lebanese and Syrian Christian descendants (about 15 million), with Palestinians in the minority (200.000) (Band UOL 2023). Both the Jewish and Palestinian communities are also divided, which undermines their lobbying capacity^[4].

In contrast, the most vocal group comes from the radicalized circles of Bolsonarismo. This is because of their affinity with Israel due to religious issues, but also in pursuit of domestic political goals. In the interviews I conducted in December 2023, one factor that diplomats mentioned as new and influential in their work on the Middle East compared to Lula's other terms in office is the increased activism of various far-right-wing groups. Israel's weight in the Brazilian economy is minor in relative terms. This pro-Israel stance is linked above all to the identification of radicalized evangelical groups with Israel, facilitated by the conservative and also radical character of the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu (2022–).

Israel's weight in the Brazilian economy is minor in relative terms. This [Brazilian far-right] pro-Israel stance is linked above all to the identification of radicalized evangelical groups with Israel, facilitated by the conservative and also radical character of the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu.

Municipal elections are being held in Brazil this November. In the city of São Paulo, the race is partly organized based on Lula/Bolsonaro's opposition. The candidate of the left, Guilherme Boulos of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), has the support of Lula's PT and is emerging as the symbol of the belated renewal of the left in Brazil. Opposition candidate Ricardo Nunes, increasingly close to Bolsonarism, labeled Boulos as a "friend of Hamas" to discredit him (Meyerfeld 2024a). This anecdote illustrates the domestic use of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Consequently, the famous Brazilian harmony, according to which Middle East conflicts do not affect this country, is cracking. There are already some reports of increasing acts of hostility towards the Jewish community and Muslim believers in Brazil (Lima 2023; Meyerfeld 2023). The radicalized Brazilian society has found in the Gaza war a new source of political polarization.

LULA’S DECLARATION ON THE GAZA WAR AND NAZISM: A SPOTLIGHT ON RADICALIZED ENVIRONMENTS

In these tense environments, Lula delivered a speech in Ethiopia to the African Union on February 17, 2024, during which the Brazilian President compared the attacks in Gaza to Nazi practices (The Times 2024). This statement has been highly mediatized both internationally and domestically. The first question when it comes to President Lula’s speeches is whether the statement was included in his notes, which would reveal that it was premeditated and part of a political strategy, or whether it was an improvised move. While this clarification does not change the effects of the words used, it matters in terms of the objectives of the Brazilian authorities. According to anonymous diplomatic sources, it was an improvisation (Figueiredo 2024). In the video, during this part of the speech, Lula is not reading the notes, but looking at the audience the whole time. Others point out that it reflects the influence of Celso Amorim, in search of global leadership (Gaspar 2024).

Once again, immediate circumstances matter. Just before Ethiopia, Lula had traveled to Egypt to address the Arab League, where he raised awareness of the humanitarian situation in Gaza. A few days earlier, a scandal involving the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had come to light; it was accused of employing people who participated in the October 7 attacks. As a result, several countries cut their contributions to the agency, which quickly led to a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Lula reacted strongly to these decisions as counterproductive and offered a contribution from Brazil (Da Silva 2024b). He again expressed his dissatisfaction in this regard after his controversial remarks.

In any case, the President’s statement unleashed an open crisis with Israel and a wave of internal criticism. The relationship with that country had already been tense due to the positions of the Brazilian government regarding the conflict, the lack of Israeli support for the repatriation of Brazilian nationals, and the public relations of the Israeli ambassador, Daniel Zonshine, with Jair Bolsonaro (Rodrigues & Nogueira 2023). The reaction of the Israeli authorities to this speech delivered before an international audience was not long in coming. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared Lula persona non grata in Israel until he apologized, and the Brazilian representative in Tel Aviv was summoned and scolded. In reciprocity, Itamaraty repatriated its representative and also recalled the Israeli ambassador to Brazil for consultations. It was the fourth such recall since the beginning of the Gaza war. 

What is striking is that these high tensions have not led to the rupture of diplomatic relations and, according to press sources, Itamaraty is preventing this from happening, keeping with the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of maintaining contact with all its counterparts (Camarotti 2024). Lula’s administration has still resisted breaking off diplomatic relations, unlike Gustavo Petro’s Colombia in May 2024.

This episode also led to talks with U.S. representatives (NACLA 2024; Chade 2024). However, that country does not seem to be a key element for understanding the Brazilian position on the issue, unlike other international issues, such as Russia’s war against Ukraine. The speech received some spontaneous and uncoordinated support from Heads of State in Latin America, as well as the backing of pro-Palestinian sectors of civil society around the world.

Since then, the Brazilian authorities have tried to follow the same balancing position, albeit more favorable to the Palestinian side. Regarding efforts to maintain ties with Israel, President Lula accepted the army's request to buy artillery equipment from Israel, despite opposition from his party (Seabra & Feitoza 2024). 

However, due to contextual and interpersonal factors, Brazil’s relations with Israel seem increasingly difficult to maintain. At the time of the targeted attacks between Israel and Iran, the government took more time to strongly condemn the Iranian response (Estadão Conteúdo 2024). Recently, Lula’s government has even decided not to return its ambassador to Tel Aviv at the end of May 2024 (RFI 2024). It is the Chargé d’affaires who has taken over the Brazilian representation for the time being.

Given the prolongation of the high-intensity conflict and the growing number of violations of international law committed by both sides, but by Israel above all, given the disproportion of the opposing forces, Brazil's position may also find increasing resonance on the international stage.

Given the prolongation of the high-intensity conflict and the growing number of violations of international law committed by both sides, but by Israel above all, given the disproportion of the opposing forces, Brazil's position may also find increasing resonance on the international stage. Official rhetoric has constantly repeated the need for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a Palestinian State. Brazil has succeeded in maintaining contact with other governments holding different ideologies. For example, a joint declaration was issued with partners in the USA, Europe, Latin America (Argentina, Colombia), Canada, and Thailand on the issue of hostages and the cease of hostilities (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2024).

Domestically, the Brazilian President's words have provoked an intense debate, reflected in both traditional and digital media as well as in opinion polls. These indicate that a majority of citizens do not support Lula's statement (Matos 2024). In a recent survey published on Brazilian public opinion about global issues, 42% of respondents prefer their country to stay away from both sides of the conflict. The domestic polarization is reflected in the fact that 21% completely agree that the Brazilian embassy in Israel should be transferred to Jerusalem, while 21% completely disagree (Guimarães & Fernandes 2024).

More moderate opposition voices have pointed out the risks of the official position for Israel's partners in Brazil, particularly in the economic sphere (even though exchanges with this economy are smaller than with those of Muslim countries) and military sphere (due to cooperation agreements on security issues) (Casarões & Sochaczewski 2022; Rubinstein 2024). No announcement has been made that Israel will break off projects initially, unlike what happened with Colombia. In addition, far-right-wing groups took advantage of the controversy to upbraid and fiercely criticize the government and to gain an audience. On February 25, Jair Bolsonaro successfully rallied his supporters on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo to denounce the charges that could lead to his disqualification. Numerous Israeli flags were observed next to the Brazilian flag (Meyerfeld 2024b).

Thus, this polemic statement mentioning genocide is also becoming a political ploy. The government could revive it as a nod toward Brazil's more radical left to mobilize the President's camp in the electoral context (Rodrigues & Nogueira 2023). Militant groups and intellectuals of the left supported the statement. A few days later, the President reiterated his position, although without mentioning Nazism (Da Silva 2024a). Lula's controversial speech confirms how internal polarization can be deepened by a world political issue.

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, regarding the Gaza war, we can ask ourselves if Lula has changed and become more radical or if it is due to the contexts being different and giving another dimension to his foreign policy that, in the end, is quite predictable. Perhaps the answer lies in the middle. Support for Palestine, without breaking with Israel, is the position that has been adopted since Lula’s first term in office. The current escalation of the conflict is already considered unprecedented since the creation of Israel and the Nakba, which is reflected in the rhetoric of the Brazilian President. At the same time, the Gaza war illustrates how Lula has become a polarizing figure. This is well known in Brazil since his imprisonment in the context of the Lava-Jato affair. At the international level, he does not generate much consensus either, especially in the northern part of the West, due to his position on the war in Ukraine, his relationship with Vladimir Putin, with the BRICS, and with Venezuela and Cuba. It should not be forgotten that his positions have also generated disagreements in the past. The attempt to resolve tensions over the Iranian nuclear program, with the Tehran Declaration negotiated with Turkey in 2010, was categorically rejected by the established powers. In this regard, Lula’s return to power may have generated too many expectations and a certain amnesia after the difficulties stemming from the tumultuous Jair Bolsonaro.

In this article, I have focused on Brazil's foreign policy decision-making process. There are many more actors in Brazil, unrelated to the government, speaking out on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Vasconcelos, Clemesha & Guimarães 2021). It would be interesting to study whether the polarization between the dominant political groups is reproduced in civil society, as a reflection of this characteristic of Brazilian society, but also of the echo of the Palestinian cause at the global level and the seriousness of the current war in Gaza.

Notes

[1] Chile’s center-right Sebastián Piñera was an exception, as he also recognized the Palestinian State at the time, although without specifying the border issue.

[2] This article is an updated version of “El gobierno brasileño de Lula ante la guerra de Gaza: una postura previsible en ambientes radicalizados” (Brun 2024), published by Foro Internacional. I thank Margaret Schroeder for the revision of the English translation.

[3] A career diplomat, he had already served as Minister of Foreign Relations in the 1990s and was Minister of Defense for part of Dilma Rousseff’s term of office.

[4] For a very critical Jewish view of Israel, see Pauta Pública (2024).

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Submitted: June 22, 2024

Accepted for publication: July 9, 2024

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