A Organização dos Estados Americanos na encruzilhada

The Organization of American States (OAS) begins a new chapter in 2025 with the first election, since its creation in 1948, of a Secretary-General from a member state within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Suriname's Foreign Minister, Albert Ramdin, was elected for a five-year term, which began on May 26, 2025, succeeding Uruguay's Luis Almagro, who held the position for ten years. This election comes at a critical time for the organization, with the freezing and cutting of part of the United States’s voluntary contributions to specific programs, uncertainty regarding its future participation as the body responsible for 50% of the regular budget, and growing challenges in all areas of the inter-American system (democracy, human rights, hemispheric security, and development), all within a rapidly deteriorating regional and global political and economic environment.

Over the past decade, the OAS has suffered a loss of credibility among certain decision-making circles and political leaders in many countries in the region. Although it has continued to provide important services, which will be discussed later, the image of an increasingly fractured and even counterproductive organization has prevailed. While this image may not accurately reflect everything the organization stands for, it is undeniable that, on sensitive and high-octane political issues, the OAS's relevance as a multilateral forum for consultation has waned in the last decade. Some successes on this front have been overshadowed by notable failures, amid the exacerbation of old rivalries and the emergence of new ones.

The OAS began this past decade with 35 member states. One of these members is Cuba, whose suspension from the inter-American system, imposed in 1962, was revoked in 2009. However, the Cuban government indicated no interest in changing the country's status within the organization. Venezuela denounced the OAS Charter in 2017. However, before the two-year period for the denunciation to take effect had elapsed, most OAS member states accepted the then-Guaidó government's invalidation of the denunciation, which even went so far as to accredit an ambassador. With the end of Guaidó's term, his ambassador resigned, and today, an empty chair with the Venezuelan flag hangs at official meetings. In 2021, Nicaragua also denounced the Charter, leading to its effective withdrawal from the OAS in 2023.

While the OAS had 35 member states and 34 participants in 2015, today there are legally 34 member states, but only 32 participate. Some observers and analysts believe that misguided decisions by a majority of countries have not only led to the erosion of the organization's effectiveness but also limited its ability to provide solutions, address crises, and mediate conflicts. Additionally, the very peculiar institutional culture and lax procedural rules within the OAS, paradoxically an organization that played an important role in the development of international law, have contributed to this.

Evidence of this disorder and institutional culture was reflected in the response given by a senior Organization official to the question about the legality of recognizing the Guaidó "government" as the legitimate representative of the Venezuelan state, despite its lack of effective control over the country's population and territory. The answer came in the form of another question: “Do the countries that recognize Guaidó as Venezuela's ruler have 18 votes? If so, it is legal.” In an organization with 34 member states, having 18 votes allows most political decisions to be made, disregarding even the most basic principles of international law. Depending on the political situation, an automatic majority can be formed without any barriers to the steamroller over the minority. This is obviously not always the case, as the succession of governments in different countries changes alignments and impacts the "parliamentary balance" within the OAS.

The election of new leadership at the organization created expectations that it would pave the way for renewal, modernization, and, perhaps, the overcoming of obstacles, allowing the organization to become more effective and legitimate. Despite this cautious optimism, doubts persist, and uncertainties are amplified by the critical moment facing multilateralism, in general, and the OAS, in particular. U.S. foreign policy has a systemic effect on the international order as a whole. However, its impact on the OAS is disproportionately greater than that on other international organizations and regimes. It can be said that the OAS is at a crossroads that requires additional effort to understand reality, comprehend how it arrived at this point, and explore the future possibilities that lie ahead for the organization.

This article’s objective^[1] is to put the role of the OAS as the world's oldest regional organization into perspective, investigate its central current dilemmas, and reflect on possible paths toward the future. With these goals in mind, it will be necessary to take a quick look back to assess its historical trajectory and identify the organization's most defining characteristics at different periods. This preliminary step will help reveal both more or less constant characteristics and significant changes in the OAS's life over its 77-year history. It is essential to utilize the past as a guide to understand the present, while also examining potential trends that may influence the future, and remaining mindful of the risks and uncertainties arising from a fluid and rapidly changing international environment.

THREE MOMENTS OF THE OAS

As Mônica Herz (2011, 4) points out, the role and identity of international organizations are a political process tied to their historical context. Therefore, it is impossible to understand the OAS without reference to the broader context of power relations in the region and the world. Founding documents, such as the OAS Charter, with their principles and purposes, are undoubtedly important, but they tell only part of the story. Reading them reveals the institutional contours, the broad guidelines that guide the organization's activities, and the responsibilities of its various bodies. In general, such documents translate the political environment of the time, the power relations in the region and the world, and a hegemonic vision of supposedly shared interests and values into legal language.

The OAS was created shortly after World War II as part of a new multilateral architecture. Its origins date back to the 19th century. OAS enthusiasts often point to the Panama Congress of 1826, convened by the Liberator Simón Bolívar, as the birth certificate of what would become the inter-American system. The OAS is also considered the heir to the Pan-American conference processes that began in the late 19th century and led to the creation of the Pan-American Union in 1910. The conference process contributed to the consolidation of principles such as the peaceful resolution of disputes and the sovereign equality of states at the regional level.

Often vilified, these principles remain to this day and continue to constitute, if not as an absolute guarantee, then at least as a source of international legitimacy for the defense of the sovereignty and independence of the countries in the region.

As Jean Michel Arrighi (2004, 86-7) points out:

The contributions made since the beginning of the 20th century deserve special mention in terms of respect for the principle of non-intervention, the independence and sovereignty of States, and their legal equality; the promotion of means of peaceful dispute resolution; the defense of equal treatment between nationals and foreigners; the establishment of territorial and diplomatic asylum; and the regulation of extradition (...).

Some people tend to disparage international law as the weakest branch of law. Indeed, the lack of a supreme authority capable of enforcing norms is a fundamental characteristic of international relations; however, this does not render international law and multilateral mechanisms ineffective. The degree of respect for law and multilateral institutions, which are created to promote common goals, tends to vary depending on power relations, as well as the ideas that assume prominence and influence the internal decision-making processes of various countries. Multilateral norms and institutions, even when used to favor interests that respond to power realities, often led to the justification of certain decisions with references to legal principles in search of an appearance of legitimacy.

At certain times, such as the ones we are experiencing today, changes in the international landscape generate increased skepticism regarding the principles of international law and the norms that underpin the multilateral system. Even then, the quest for legitimacy persists, though it becomes more clearly the kind of tribute vice pays to virtue, like La Rochefoucauld’s famous definition of hypocrisy. Far from being unprecedented, this is a characteristic that realists and other schools of thought tirelessly point to as an inseparable element of international reality, whose power relations in an anarchic environment impose limits on the action of institutions and the effectiveness of norms.

The purpose here is not to delve into a theoretical debate on this topic, which would lead us down another path. Instead, it is to emphasize that the OAS, despite its ups and downs, crises, and clashes among its member states, has consolidated a legal arsenal and a tradition of norm-based coexistence in the region, with varying degrees of respect over the years. The interpretation of specific rules and shared commitments has also evolved as the inter-American system and its members have changed internally, altering their relative political, military, economic, and social positions within the regional framework.

Looking back at the period since the founding of the OAS and its enduring legacy, it’s possible to identify distinct phases in the organization’s development from 1948 to the present. Of course, dividing history into periods is always somewhat arbitrary, since certain features often carry over from one phase to the next or resurface later on. Even so, periodization is useful for making sense of the OAS’s evolution. It highlights key structural characteristics and major turning points that have changed how the organization functions, shaping when and how it can innovate and have a real impact on the countries of the Americas and the Caribbean.

The OAS’s history can be broadly divided into three phases: the founding era and the Cold War; the post–Cold War period, beginning with democratic transitions in several member states and extending through the late 1990s and early 2000s turbulence, including the September 11 attacks in 2001, the 2006 crisis, Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump in 2016; and the current era of intense polarization, which has coincided with Luis Almagro’s decade-long tenure as Secretary General, and continues into the present with the election of a new Secretary General during Trump’s second term in office.

The OAS during the Cold War

The OAS was created in 1948 with the signing of its Charter in Bogotá. It is the result of the post-World War II geopolitical restructuring. In addition to the Pan American Union, its predecessor, the new organization began to house other regional organizations, some of them pioneering. For example, the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM), created in 1928, is the first international intergovernmental organization dedicated exclusively to women's issues, and the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH), also created in 1928. Later, during World War II, in 1942, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in response to growing interest in strengthening cooperation in this area. In 1947, a year before the founding of the OAS, the Pact of Rio de Janeiro, also known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), was adopted. This treaty, in theory, would serve as a mechanism for collective security in the region against external aggression.

Therefore, the founding of the OAS coincided with the onset of the Cold War; it reflected the division of the world into spheres of influence and the emergence of a new strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would intensify over the years. The OAS became hostage to this bipolarity and the East-West conflict. The asymmetry of power between the United States and the other member states, a structural feature of the organization that persists to this day, was even more pronounced at that time. American leadership helped shape commitments to strategic solidarity and define the inter-American system as incompatible with anti-democratic regimes. Of course, the definition of democracy was shaped by Washington's strategic interests in its global fight against communism, so being democratic was often synonymous with being anti-communist.

Undoubtedly, the 1959 Cuban Revolution was seen as an unacceptable threat and a challenge to the division of the world into spheres of influence. It was no surprise that the world came to the brink of nuclear catastrophe in 1962, during the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis. Even before the onset of this crisis, Cuba had already had its membership in the Inter-American system suspended by a resolution adopted at a ministerial consultation meeting. The justification applied to Cuba contained a general warning, establishing that any OAS member's adherence to Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the Inter-American system. A few years later, the OAS was used to legitimize the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, also in the name of saving the country from the clutches of communism. Brazil, already under military rule, happily embarked on this Dominican adventure (Nasser 2024, 554). In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the OAS stood by idly as US interventionism took place in the name of shared hemispheric values, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, supporting political forces and governments considered allies in the anti-communist struggle, often through invasions or military support. The U.S. also actively supported military regimes in the Southern Cone, maintaining generally cordial and cooperative relations. Although these regimes were authoritarian, their "excesses" were considered lesser evils in the face of the global strategic struggle against communism. Political repression, executions, systematic torture, and the forced disappearance of opponents were overlooked, without provoking embarrassment from those who considered such practices merely collateral damage in the attempt to safeguard democracy and protect Western values.

There were shifts in emphasis during this period, but they did not significantly alter the long‑term trajectory. The Jimmy Carter administration (1977-1981) is often considered an outlier in this period, due to its greater concern for human rights, which allowed criticism of military regimes. In Robert Kagan's view (2012, p. 28), the shift introduced by Carter persisted, even into the Reagan administration, which ultimately adopted a policy of promoting democracy. This did not prevent support and arms supplies to the Nicaraguan Contras, nor did it discourage the invasions of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), all in the name of democracy. The OAS, seen as incapable of serving as a forum for mediation, remained relatively ineffective in seeking solutions to conflicts until the second half of the 1980s.

The Decline of the Cold War and the Golden Age of the OAS

The Cold War was not merely a period during which the OAS was used to organize U.S. relations with its 'backyard,' a term many Americans use to describe the region, often unaware of the negative connotations it carries elsewhere in the hemisphere. Even trapped in the ideological straitjacket of the fight against communism, the OAS took some steps to structure independent mechanisms, particularly in the area of human rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), created in 1959, saw its powers expanded with the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), signed in 1969 but entered into force a decade later. Despite tentative steps at its inception, the IACHR would become a crucial vehicle for monitoring human rights in all countries of the Americas, including those that did not adhere to the Pact of San José.

The 1980s were marked by democratic transitions in several countries in the region, including Brazil. Gradually, revolutionary armed movements in the region transformed into political parties and joined the democratic political scene, a phenomenon that former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda (1994) referred to as an "disarmed utopia." This period coincided with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and the beginning of a détente process that would lead to free elections in the socialist bloc, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. This regional and international environment was crucial for the OAS to regain momentum and begin to act more effectively in conflict mediation, electoral observation, the defense of democracy, and the protection of human rights.

In 1984, the OAS member states elected Brazilian João Clemente Baena Soares as Secretary-General. This election aligned with the member states' desire to reform the OAS Charter to streamline decision-making processes and grant the Secretary-General a more active role. The Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, signed in December 1985, introduced innovations such as Article 115 of the Charter, which granted the OAS Secretary-General the authority to bring before the General Assembly and the Permanent Council (the organization's two most important political bodies) any matter that, in his opinion, "may affect the peace and security of the continent or the development of the Member States."

Baena Soares was responsible for injecting new dynamism into the OAS. As a seasoned diplomat, he had previously served as Secretary-General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, bringing in-depth knowledge of the region's political realities, the idiosyncrasies of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the hegemonic foreign policy of the United States. Armed with this arsenal and a sophisticated understanding of the regional and global landscape, Baena opened several fronts that yielded tangible results. In the field of mediation, he carried out heroic missions in several countries, such as when he was besieged by Salvadoran guerrillas at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador in 1989. His negotiating skills enabled him to defuse tense situations and become a key interlocutor in a number of crises and civil wars in Central America and the Caribbean.

During this period, the Organization of American States broadened its membership through the integration of Canada, Belize, Guyana, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. In addition to securing the incorporation of the countries of the continent that were not yet members, Baena managed to sign a Headquarters Agreement with the United States, providing greater legal security for the organization, its staff, and country delegates. At the end of the Cold War, Baena Soares led the organization's redirection toward the defense and promotion of democracy. In 1991, the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System was adopted, along with Resolution 1080 on Representative Democracy, one of the precursors to the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted in 2001.

Resolution 1080 instructed "the Secretary-General to request the convening of the Permanent Council if events occur that lead to an abrupt or irregular interruption of the democratic institutional political process, or the legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government in any of the member states of the Organization." Furthermore, the provision stated that, after examining the situation, the Permanent Council could convene a meeting of foreign ministers or even call an extraordinary session of the General Assembly. Baena recounts, in his summary of his tenure as Secretary-General, six cases in which he acted based on this resolution, involving situations in Panama, Peru, Guatemala, Haiti, Suriname, and Venezuela (Baena Soares 1994, 25).

Although averse to flashy diplomacy, Baena elevated the position, using the new instruments with prudence and discretion. Initially, he did not garner American sympathy, as former U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Luigi Einaudi recounts. The United States distrusted Baena's independent approach and had not supported him in his election as Secretary General. However, it was this approach that made him effective. Einaudi recalls Baena's veto of U.S. participation in the OAS's first robust electoral observation mission, in Nicaragua, in 1990. The belief that a U.S. presence would not be accepted and would derail the mission proved correct. The Secretary General's position removed the barrier that prevented the OAS from conducting observation with broad access to polling and counting locations, and was crucial in ensuring respect for the popular will (Einaudi 2023, 252).

This experience in Nicaragua created a new model for electoral observation missions, featuring real analytical capabilities, contacts with political actors, monitoring of polling locations, and even observation of vote-counting processes. Additionally, during this period, the Inter-American human rights system evolved, with the 1994 adoption of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará). The OAS's period of intense and productive activity continued even after Baena's departure, with the ad of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001, which expanded the scope of threats to democracy and recognized the interdependence between democracy, human rights, and development. A key milestone in this period was the decision to nullify Cuba's suspension from the Inter-American system in 2009, as noted in the introduction.

In summary, the end of the Cold War, the pacification of Central America, and the democratic transitions in several countries in the region in the 1980s and 1990s changed the equation. Once a hostage to East-West bipolarity, the OAS began to reflect a more complex game and the growing independence of the region's countries. Freed from the constraints of automatic alignment with the US, countries began to pursue their interests with greater freedom. The optimism and sense of convergence that followed the end of the Cold War likely contributed to this evolution.

The New Era of Extremes

The optimism of the immediate post-Cold War era quickly gave way to uncertainty and new crises. In Europe, long-standing ethnic tensions were exploited for political purposes, fueling new forms of nationalism marked by xenophobia and intolerance. In the former Yugoslavia, this process led to fragmentation, with particularly bloody episodes, unilateral interventions, and violations of International Humanitarian Law. In July 1995, over two weeks, more than eight thousand Bosnian Muslims were murdered in what has become known as the Srebrenica genocide or massacre. The Kosovo war (1998-1999), marked by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention through the so-called "surgical bombings" without authorization from the United Nations Security Council, was justified on the grounds of preventing another genocide, even though the results were questionable. Europe was not the only continent to witness the rise of hate speech and atrocities. The Rwandan civil war was the scene of the Tutsi genocide between April and June 1994, resulting in more than 800,000 deaths. The September 2001 attacks on the United States deepened the feeling of division, with consequences still felt to this day. Considered the only global power, enjoying its unipolar moment, the United States endured the worst external attack on its territory in history. The response was a reorganization of the security apparatus and the prioritization of the global fight against terrorism, relegating concerns for human rights and international law to the background, particularly evident in the interventions in Afghanistan, which began in 2001, and Iraq, in 2003.

The 2008 financial crisis generated another earthquake, exposing the inability of the United States and the developed countries, gathered in the G7, to respond to the situation and revive the global economy. The financial G20 was formed, which would expand its spheres of activity over the years, demonstrating that emerging countries were fundamental to any attempt to inject rationality into the international system. The emergence of BRICS in 2006 was seen as further evidence that the unipolar moment did not accurately describe the international reality. On the contrary, it seemed to demonstrate a growing multipolarity in the global distribution of power, with China's impressive rise as the main novelty, as well as the active participation of Brazil, India, South Africa, and Russia.

This picture is further complicated by an anti-globalization and anti-integration drift, exemplified by events such as Brexit and the unexpected election of Donald Trump in 2016. In the countries of the Americas, political polarization has reached unprecedented levels, now fueled by the rise of new movements that defend so-called traditional values and oppose diversity and social inclusion policies. The OAS, which had already lost some of its dynamism in the previous decade, elected Luis Almagro as Secretary-General in 2015. A new chapter opened, which, like every inaugural phase, commands a certain optimism. However, the following years were marked by many disagreements, in which polarization at the domestic level was reflected in the organization's debates and deliberations, sometimes blocking decisions and sometimes allowing controversial decisions to be taken by narrow majorities. New divisions emerged in a context characterized by a relative loss of civility in internal political disputes, a rise in political extremism and scientific denialism, particularly in the fields of climate and health, combined with digital guerrilla strategies and systematic spread of disinformation in our age of social media. All of this also had an adverse effect on the OAS. Political Manichaeism began to dictate both the decisions of political bodies and social media posts, contaminating the air breathed in the corridors of the organization.

The extreme polarization was particularly notable in the handling of the Venezuelan crisis, in which the OAS ultimately deprived itself of any ability to mediate between the government and the opposition. Not only was Guaidó's provisional "government" allowed to speak on Venezuela's behalf in the OAS, but with the vote of Guaidó's ambassador, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was invoked to impose sanctions on the Maduro government, with the active support of the countries comprising the so-called Lima Group. A relic of the Cold War, the TIAR, which was created to shield the region against external aggression, was applied practically only to interventions against countries within its region.

The power of the 18-vote majority enabled resolutions condemning Venezuela and Nicaragua, resulting in the progressive isolation of these countries. It must be acknowledged that, over time, the OAS lost relevance in addressing the crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua. To understand the underlying reasons, it is helpful to compare this situation with that in another country, Guatemala, where the OAS played a positive and significant role. The key difference is that, despite being under intense scrutiny in 2023 for allegedly attempting to prevent the inauguration of President-elect Bernardo Arévalo, the Guatemalan government found space for dialogue within the OAS.

Brazil played a crucial role in calibrating political pressure without breaking off dialogue, thereby avoiding the automatic recourse to the idea of possibly suspending the country for violating the Inter-American Democratic Charter. With a prudent strategy, counting on the country's participation in the negotiations, progress was made. The OAS sent an electoral observation mission, a transition monitoring mission, a mediation team between the government and social movements, and a visit by a group of five ambassadors. The isolation strategy could give the impression, to domestic audiences in several countries, that something was being done, even if its results were meager. This is why the OAS can serve as a platform for speeches and criticism, which is not without impact; however, its ability to mediate cases involving countries with which it lacks dialogue is virtually nonexistent. Guatemala may have been a special case of convergence during this period. However, there were other, less publicized efforts, such as the mediation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic regarding the use of a shared border river. Despite the extreme polarization and political missteps that left deep scars during this period, the OAS remained important in addressing everyday challenges not only in democracy, electoral cooperation, and human rights, but also in areas such as combating organized crime and drug trafficking, access to healthcare, technical cooperation, sustainable development, and climate change.

It is undeniable that the new wave of polarization has intensified ideological divisions within OAS debates. The first step in this direction occurred when countries' internal political clashes began to incorporate international references. In internal rhetorical battles, it was common to use the negative example of other countries governed by leaders who allegedly shared ideological affinities with the internal adversary as an electoral weapon. 

For example, it is often claimed that voting for a particular candidate would transform their country into “another Venezuela”. This tactic not only has an internal impact but also creates a boomerang effect. Once elected on the basis of such rhetoric, maintaining relations with Venezuela without “losing face” will be challenging. In multilateral bodies, this will lead to the use of a hardline stance with Venezuela, in addition to creating distance from countries whose governments share any remote ideological kinship with the Venezuelan government.

This shifts the battle to a multilateral arena, where it is no longer exclusively domestic but also becomes predominantly transnational, uniting different governments of similar persuasion in their crusade against common enemies, typically identified with the liberal and progressive agenda. The so-called "culture war" invaded the OAS a few years ago and is reflected in the difficulties of negotiating resolutions addressing diversity, inclusion, equality, women's rights and gender imbalances, social protection policies, and sustainable development, among others. The OAS's rift in this regard is not limited to political bodies comprised of states, but also extends to the Secretariat itself and independent bodies, such as the IACHR.

OAS AT A CROSSROADS: WHERE ARE WE GOING?

The feeling that we are living in unprecedented times, without a light at the end of the tunnel, brings to mind a passage from Raymond Aron's 1960 lecture, in which the thinker observed that every generation in Europe since the 19th century had felt they were living in an unprecedented era. The question Aron raised was whether this feeling, through its persistence in successive generations, would prove itself false, or if, on the contrary, it was a kind of premonition, false for those who preceded us, but true for ourselves (Aron 2005, 1786). The trajectory of the OAS demonstrates that history is not teleological: each era brings its own challenges, which are faced with varying degrees of success depending on several factors, particularly the distribution and circulation of political and economic power as weel as ideas, the institutional tools available and the quality of leadership both within the member countries and the organization itself. As discussed in this essay, the difficulties faced by multilateral organizations reflect global power dynamics. These institutions were created to provide a certain predictability and foster an environment of cooperation, based on the assumption that collective action would increase the chances of success in addressing everyday challenges related to peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, democracy, international trade, and many other areas. The individual power of countries does not disappear. However, it operates within a context of norms and commitments that create certain constraints, thus allowing multilateral organizations to provide provide services and help to generate a regional or international order more conducive to the realization of everyone's interests (although some may benefit more than others).

The crux of the multilateral problem, then, would be to answer why, on certain occasions, states, naturally protected by the notion of sovereignty, would accept collective services and, with them, the constraints of general rules. An initial observation suggests that the existence of rules does not eliminate particular interests, but somewhat limits them, providing guidelines for how to project them. However, these constraints must be offset by advantages. This explains why, despite being individualistic, States have developed multilateralizable interests, that is, interests that can be achieved through cooperation (Fonseca Jr. 2008, 23).

In the specific case of the OAS, the perception that the services provided compensate for the potential limitation of individualistic interests has varied dramatically over time. This calculation was also influenced by political reality. During the Cold War, the Southern Cone military dictatorships viewed the OAS as a club of anti-communist countries, whose primary function was to create an environment of solidarity and mutual support in the common battle against internal and external enemies. During the period of détente and the end of the Cold War, with the democratization of several countries in the region, the OAS was seen as a safeguard against new coups d'état. The focus shifted from the anti-communist struggle, which was no longer relevant after the socialist bloc left the scene, to ensuring free elections and preventing authoritarian setbacks.

The exacerbation of political polarization in new guises and characteristics, accompanied by the return of a certain Cold War mentality against the supposed threat posed by the hegemony of liberal ideas, made the environment more challenging. For some countries, what Gelson Fonseca terms "multilateralizable interests" are undergoing a transformation in which the notions of democracy, human rights, security, and even development acquire new meanings. For instance, if the OAS and its independent bodies, such as the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, uphold a traditional notion of human rights based on legal instruments and jurisprudence, their services become less valuable from the perspective of some governments.

Moreover, if among these governments, there are countries with significant political and economic influence, the institution faces a twofold risk: a crisis caused by disengagement and a lack of funding for activities in all areas, or attempts at manipulation, either through majority-based decisions or by occupying privileged positions within the organization's structure and independent bodies. However, none of these alternatives are acceptable to countries like Brazil, which advocate for an Organization that serves everyone and strengthens its role as a political concertation body, preserving the capacity to build collective solutions through dialogue and diplomacy, with strict observance of International Law.

Some might say this position is quixotic given the enormity of the challenge posed by the new configuration of the international landscape, the exacerbation of the so-called culture war, and the growing fissures between parallel and alternative conceptions of democracy, human rights, and development. We should not underestimate the challenge, however the election of the new Secretary-General is an opportunity to build a common path forward, beginning with the organization's management reform, so that everyone can be sure that investment in programs yields tangible returns, including in the fight against transnational organized crime, the fight against the global drug problem, the coordinated response to disasters and humanitarian crises, and on topics such as cybersecurity, anti-corruption, among others.

It is also important to highlight success stories, whose lessons must be incorporated into the OAS's work, such as the cooperation that sustained democracy in Guatemala. Brazil has worked to prevent political fragmentation from finding fertile ground to thrive. The idea is to prevent groups of countries from imposing their will, often employing the strategy of surprise, by drafting proposals in the dead of night and exploiting overly lax procedural rules that force deliberations without extensive discussion. Therefore, we have fought against the habit of using the OAS to gain points in domestic political disputes. This approach almost always results in facile rhetoric that pits "us, defenders of good, against them, the evil." While Manichaeism may be effective in political campaigns, it is a poor guide in international relations. Brazil has led the discussion on negotiating practices and procedural rules to expand the scope for negotiation, allowing any proposals from political bodies to be prepared with transparency and greater engagement from all, as opposed to texts drafted in secret by small groups. This practice tends to undermine trust and fuel further polarization and dysfunction. Furthermore, it has sought to highlight the advantages and protection offered by multilateralism to forge a kind of informal "broad front" that favors the strength of the argument, in contrast to the purely argument of force.

This effort must be collective, or it will be ineffective. Regaining trust in processes and results is always challenging, regardless of the circumstances. In times of growing unilateralism and extreme polarization, the task becomes even more complex. This generation, experiencing the current moment as unique, may feel inevitably discouraged as it witnesses the crumbling of old certainties and the tendency to disregard multilateral mechanisms and instruments that have accumulated heritage, despite their imperfections. It will be up to the countries most committed to multilateralism and international law to weather the storm, not to build an unrealizable utopia, but to pragmatically demonstrate the collective advantages of having strong, effective, and legitimate multilateral institutions.

The OAS could eventually serve as a positive example, bearing in mind that the goal is not to ensure a perfect world, but to prevent the world from falling apart, to paraphrase the famous passage from Albert Camus's speech upon receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957.

Note

[1]This article was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect official positions of the Brazilian government.

References

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Einaudi, Luigi. 2023. Learning Diplomacy: An Oral History. Bloomington: Xlibris: 252.

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Nasser, Filipe. 2024. “Triste tarde no Hotel Embajador: notas sobre a coadjuvação brasileira na intervenção norte-americana na República Dominicana (1965-1966)”. Em Uma parceria bicentenária: passado, presente e futuro das relações Brasil-Estados Unidos, Fernanda Petená Magnotta (org.). Brasília: Plubisher: FUNAG: 105-131. https://funag.gov.br/biblioteca-nova/produto/1-1277. 

Recebido: 16 de abril de 2025

Aceito para publicação: 28 de abril de 2025

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